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A JUDICIOUS SOLUTION: THE CRIMINAL LAW
COMMITTEE DRAFT REDEFINITION OF THE "LOSS"
CONCEPT IN ECONOMIC CRIME SENTENCING
Frank 0. Bowman, Ir
INTRODUCTION
In December 1999, the United States Sentencing Commission (Com-
mission), an institution that had been in suspended animation for over a
year with all seven voting seats vacant, fluttered its eyelids and came back
to life. An agreement between the Senate and the White House produced
seven new Commissioners: five sitting federal judges, the former General
Counsel of the Commission, and a law professor. The new group began
work immediately, making itself accessible in meetings with lawyers and
judges around the country, exuding an air of intelligence and collegiality,
and dispensing in short order with a backlog of amendments to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) mandated by Congress.' Having
cleared away most of the housekeeping chores that had piled up during its
long sleep, the Commission recently turned to issues of broader scope.
The first major undertaking of the newly-appointed Commission has
been a reexamination of economic crime sentencing. In choosing eco-
nomic crime sentencing reform as its initial large project, the new Com-
mission elected to build on a foundation laid by its immediate predeces-
sors. Staff work on economic crime sentencing reform began in 1995.' In
January 1997, the Commission promulgated issues for comment on eco-
nomic crime sentencing reform 3 and held public hearings in 1997 and
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis. Formerly Spe-
cial Counsel, United States Sentencing Commission, 1995-96. Professor Bowman has worked with
members of the Committee on Criminal Law (CLC) of the United States Judicial Conference on issues
related to economic crime sentencing since 1998. He wishes to express his profound gratitude to Judge
George P. Kazen, former Chair of the CLC, Judge William W. Wilkins, Chair of the CLC, Judge J.
Phil Gilbert, former Chair of the Sentencing Guidelines Subcommittee of the CLC, Judge Sim Lake,
current Chair of the Subcommittee, and Catharine Goodwin, Assistant General Counsel, Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts, for inviting him to assist the Committee in its work. The views ex-
pressed in this Article are those of Professor Bowman, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
CLC or any member thereof.
1 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C, amends. 590-607 (2000) [hereinafter
U.S.S.G.].
2 See, e.g., Memorandum of Frank 0. Bowman, Ill, Special Counsel, U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion, to Donald A. Purdy, Chief Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Sentencing Commission, Summary and
Analysis of Judicial Interpretations of the Term "Loss" in U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1 and 2F1.1, Apr. 16, 1996
(on file with author).
3 Federal Register Notice BAC2210-40, 62 Fed. Reg. 152, 171-74 (1997).
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1998.4 In January 1998, the Commission published for comment a com-
prehensive economic crime reform package that would have consolidated
the theft and fraud guidelines, revised the loss table at the heart of both
guidelines, and redefined the exasperating, but pivotal, term "loss." 5 In
April 1998, a revised version of the package came within one vote of ob-
taining the unanimous approval it required. Unfortunately, no further for-
mal action was possible in 1998-99 because, by the fall of 1998, the terms
of all the Commissioners had expired and the vacancies remained unfilled
until December 1999.
At the core of the last Commission's economic crime package lay the
redefinition of the concept of 'loss.' The amount of loss inflicted by a con-
victed criminal is a primary determinant of sentence length for economic
crimes. Yet, as will be discussed below, the current Guidelines provisions
regarding the meaning of loss are a confusing patchwork. Reconsideration
of the loss definition was so plainly essential to any meaningful economic
crime sentencing initiative that, even after it became clear that they them-
selves would be unable to bring reform to fruition, the last Commission
arranged for the loss redefinition so nearly passed in April 1998 to be field
tested during the summer of 1998.6 The response to the proposed redefini-
tion by the federal judges and probation officers who participated in the
field test was overwhelmingly positive.7 Consequently, even during the
1998-99 hiatus with no sitting Commissioners, Commission staff, in con-
sultation with interested outside groups, continued to work on refining the
draft definition, with particular attention to feedback received during the
field test.
8
The Committee on Criminal Law of the United States Judicial Con-
ference (CLC) has been an interested and active participant throughout the
Commission's consideration of economic crime sentencing reform.9 In
4 In October 1997 and again in March 1998, the Commission held public hearings on proposals
to reform economic crime sentencing. (Transcripts of the hearings and copies of the written statements
of the witnesses in these hearings can be obtained at the Commission website, http:\\www.ussc.gov.)
For a discussion of the status of the evolving debate on economic crime sentencing reform as it existed
in early 1998, see Frank 0. Bowman, Il, Back To Basics: Helping the Commission Solve the "Loss"
Mess With Old Familiar Tools, 10 FED. SENT. REP. 115 (Nov./Dec. 1997).
5 63 Fed. Reg. 602, 602-09 (Jan. 6, 1998).
6 See A Field Test of Proposed Revisions to the Definition of Loss in the Theft and Fraud
Guidelines: A Report to the Commission, Oct. 20, 1998 available at http://www.ussc.gov/
pdf/lossdefn/pdf (hereinafter Field Test).
7 Id.
8 An Economic Crimes Working Group from the Sentencing Commission staff, in consultation
with outside groups such as the U.S. Judicial Conference, the Department of Justice, and the Practitio-
ners Advisory Group, continued to refine the April 1998 proposal. The staff produced a proposal for a
revised definition in May 1999. See Proposed Loss Definition May 1999 [hereinafter May 1999 Draft]
(on file with author). During 1999, work also continued on possible revisions of the loss table.
9 Representatives of the CLC testified at Commission hearings and were heavily involved in
negotiations over the shape of the package formally presented to the Sentencing Commission in April
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order to assist the Commission in its deliberations, the CLC drafted and,
on November 9, 2000, submitted to the Commission its own economic
crime sentencing reform proposal for publication for comment.1 ° The CLC
has built upon and refined the approach so nearly adopted in 1998. The
judges recommend: (1) that the theft and fraud Guidelines be consolidated;
(2) that the loss table be simplified by reducing the number of its levels
and modified by decreasing sentences for some low-loss offenders while
increasing sentences for some high-loss offenders; and (3) that loss be
redefined. More importantly, the CLC has gone beyond general recom-
mendations and transmitted to the Commission a specific proposal for a
new loss table and draft language for a redefinition of loss. (The CLC draft
of a reformed loss definition appears following this Article as Appendix
A.)
The purpose of this Article is three-fold. First, it explains the need for
consolidation of the theft and fraud guidelines and for a revised definition
of loss. Second, it introduces the CLC's proposed loss definition and ex-
plains, in detail, the reasoning behind the drafting choices made by the
judges of the CLC when preparing this proposed new definition. Third,
where appropriate, it addresses differences between the CLC proposal and
other draft definitions that have been put forward by Commission staff and
other participants in the reform process, with particular attention to the
field-tested April 1998 draft and the most recent staff draft published in
January 2001 (2001 Staff Draft)."1 This Article does not discuss the CLC
proposal regarding the loss table. 
12
I. THE CASE FOR REFORM
Between one-fifth and one-quarter of all convicted federal defendants
are sentenced for some kind of economic crime.1 3 When the original
1998. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Commission October 1997 Hearing on the Definition of "Loss":
Excerpts, 10 FED. SENT. REP. 157 (1997) (testimony of Hon. Gerald Rosen before Commission on
behalf of the CLC); J. Phil Gilbert, Statement on Loss on Behalf of the Judicial Conference Committee
on Criminal Law, 10 FED. SENT. REP. 128 (1997) (statement by then-Chair of CLC Sentencing Guide-
lines Subcommittee endorsing a common definition of loss in both theft and fraud cases).
10 See Letter of Hon. William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chair, Committee on Criminal Law of the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, to the Chair and Members of the U.S. Sentencing Commission
(with attachments), Nov. 9, 2000 (on file with author). The Commission voted to publish the CLC
proposal for comment in the Federal Register. See Federal Register Notice BAC2210-40/221 1-01
available at http://www.ussc.gov/FEDREG/fedrOl0l.htm. That portion of the CLC proposal address-
ing redefinition of "loss" is reproduced as Appendix A to this Article.
II Federal Register Notice BAC2210-40/221 1-01, Amendment 12C, Option One (Commission
Proposal), available at http://www.ussc.gov/FEDREG/fedrO101.htm (hereinafter 2001 Staff Draft).
12 The rationale behind the CLC table proposal is explained by Catharine Goodwin elsewhere in
this issue. See Catharine Goodwin, Reconsideration of the Economic "Loss " Tables: Time for Mean-
ingful Reform, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 391 (2001).
13 In 1999, 22.6% of federal criminal defendants were sentenced for fraud, larceny, embezzle-
ment, auto theft, robbery, burglary, forgery, or counterfeiting. 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
20001
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Commission wrote guidelines for economic crimes 1987, it made the idea
of loss the linchpin of the enterprise. 14 The Commission wrote separate
guidelines for theft and fraud cases. However, in both guidelines the base
offense level 15 resulting from conviction alone is very low (four in theft
cases, 16 and six in fraud cases 7 ), while the offense level can increase by up
to eighteen levels depending on the amount of loss found by the court.'
8
More concretely, the maximum term of imprisonment a judge could im-
pose on a first-time fraud offender based on the fact of conviction alone
would be six months, 19 but that sentence could increase to more than five
years based solely on the amount of loss.
20
Of course, loss amount is far from the only factor affecting sentence
length in economic crimes. A defendant's sentence can be adjusted as a
result of judicial findings on matters such as the defendant's role in the
offense, 2' his abuse of trust or misuse of a special skill, 22 whether he en-
gaged in more than minimal planning or stole from more than one victim,
23
whether the victim was particularly vulnerable,24 whether the offense was
committed using mass marketing techniques 25 or sophisticated means, 26 or
whether the crime jeopardized the safety or soundness of a financial insti-
SENTENCING STATISTICS 12, tbl. 3 (2000) (hereinafter 1999 SOURCEBOOK). The percentage of eco-
nomic crimes as a proportion of all federal offenses has declined slightly in the last few years, although
the absolute number of such offenses has increased. For example, in fiscal year 1995, 26.36% of the
federal sentences imposed were for auto theft, larceny, fraud, embezzlement, forgery, or counterfeiting.
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Annual Report 1995 60, tbl. 18 (1996) (hereinafter 1995 Annual Re-
port).
14 For an explanation of the operation of the Guidelines generally, and the guidelines on eco-
nomic crimes in particular, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, Coping With "Loss:" A Re-Examination of
Sentencing Federal Economic Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REv. 461,472-90 (1998).
15 The Guidelines measure offense seriousness on the vertical axis of a sentencing grid. U.S.S.G.
§ 5A (2000). The unit of measurement on this axis is an "offense level." The "base offense level" for a
crime is the number of offense levels awarded simply for conviction of the basic crime covered by the
particular guideline in question. A defendant's final offense level will be the product of a process of
adding to or subtracting from the base offense level as a result of other factors present in the offense. In
economic crimes, one of the principal such factors is the amount of loss. For a further explanation, see
Bowman, supra note 14.
16 U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(a)(2000).
17 U.S.S.G. § 2F1.l(a).
18 U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1. I(b)(1)(A-U), 2F1.I(b)(I)(A-S).
19 U.S.S.G. § 5A (Sentencing Table).
20 U.S.S.G. §§ 2FI.I(b), 5A. The increase in maximum available sentence from six months to
five years posited in the text assumes a first-time offender convicted of fraud with a resulting base
offense level of six who stole $80 million, the maximum amount on the loss table. It also assumes no
other adjustments to offense level other than that for loss amount.
21 U.S.S.G. §§ 3B1.I, 3B1.2 (providing two to four level increases or decreases in offense level
based on judicial findings that a defendant played an aggravating or mitigating role in the offense).
22 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.
23 U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(2).
24 U.S.S.G. § 3Al.l(b)(1).
25 U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(3).
26 U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(6).
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tution.27 Because of the logarithmic structure of the sentencing table, in
which every increase of two offense levels represents a twenty-five percent
increase in sentencing range, factors other than loss may have an even
greater percentage impact on sentence length than loss amount.28 None-
theless, the loss calculation is a constant in all theft and fraud cases and
sets the platform on which other sentence adjustments build.
In the years since the Guidelines were adopted, the loss calculation
has become one of the most commonly litigated issues in federal sentenc-
ing law. Because the loss measurement is a primary determinant of sen-
tence length in all crimes of dishonest acquisition, federal district court
judges must make loss findings in more than 9,000 cases every year.29
There are more than twelve hundred reported federal court opinions that
discuss the loss finding in some way.3° In addition to the sheer number of
opinions on loss, disputes over the meaning of the term have produced
numerous splits of opinion between the federal circuits.31 Perhaps even
more significant than either the volume of litigation or the number of
identifiable circuit splits is the overall sense of uncertainty, confusion, and
sheer aggravation that emerges whenever lawyers and judges who deal
with federal white-collar crime discuss loss. 32 As but one example, in
27 U.S.S.G. § 2F1.(b)(8)(A).
28 Assume, for example, a fraud defendant whose scheme caused a loss of $400,000. Under
section 2F1.1(a-b), his base offense level would be six, to which would be added nine levels for
amount of loss. Without more, the resulting offense level of fifteen would produce (for a first-time
offender) a sentencing range of eighteen to twenty-four months. If the defendant was the leader of a
group with five or more participants (§ 3B 1.1(a)), that used mass marketing techniques (§ 2F1. l(b)(3))
to defraud more than one victim (§ 2F1.1(b)(2)(A)), he would receive an additional eight-level upward
adjustment. This adjustment would place the defendant at offense level twenty-three, for which the
sentencing range is forty-six to fifty-seven months, more than doubling the sentence the defendant
would have received based on loss amount alone. U.S.S.G. § 5A.
29 Loss calculations are required in all fraud, larceny, and embezzlement cases. U.S.S.G. §§
2B1.1, 2FI. 1. In 1999, federal judges sentenced 6,144 fraud defendants, 2,067 larceny defendants, 949
embezzlement defendants. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 13, at 24 , tbl. 11. In addition, loss calcula-
tions are often necessary in burglary and robbery cases, U.S.S.G. §§ 2B2.1, 2B3.1. In 1999, federal
courts sentenced 1,771 robbery defendants, and fifty-three burglary defendants. U.S.S.G. §§ 2B2.1,
2B3.1. Thus, somewhere between 9,000 and 11,000, or sixteen to twenty percent, of the 54,903 federal
cases sentenced in 1999 required a determination of loss. This proportion has held roughly steady for
some years. See, e.g., 1995 Annual Report, supra note 13, at 60, tbl. 18.
30 For example, a Westlaw search conducted on November 11, 2000 revealed over 1,200 federal
cases in which loss under Guideline sections 2B 1.1 or 2F1.1 is at least mentioned. As of the same date,
there were at least 300 officially reported federal appellate decisions under section 2F1.1 alone in
which the amount of loss was an issue of sufficient moment that the opinion discussed it in detail.
ROGER W. HAINES, JR. & JENNIFER WOLL, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDE § 305 (CD-Rom Edition
2000). The Federal Sentencing Guide provides one paragraph summaries of significant sentencing
issues decided in published opinions by federal courts of appeals. It does not summarize sentencing
decisions in district court cases or in unpublished, though publicly available, appellate opinions.
31 See Bowman, supra note 14, at 464 n.3.
32 See United States v. Kaczmarski, 939 F. Supp. 1176, 1182 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 114 F.3d
1173 (3d Cir. 1997), in which Judge Dalzell refers with obvious exasperation to the task of construing
the vaporous word loss. The Second Circuit describes loss more circumspectly as a flexible, fact-
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1996, a Federal Judicial Center survey of judges and probation officers
found that both groups ranked the loss definition as the second most
pressing issue for the Commission to address.33
A. Consolidation of the Theft and Fraud Guidelines
The source of some of the confusion surrounding federal economic
crime sentencing generally, and the loss concept in particular, is the exis-
tence of one Guideline for crimes involving theft, section 2B 1.1, and an-
other for crimes involving fraud, section 2F 1.1. There is no good reason to
have two separate Guidelines for theft and fraud. There are compelling
reasons to consolidate sections 2B 1.1 and 2F 1.1.
First, the distinction between theft and fraud is largely illusory. Al-
though not all theft crimes are frauds, virtually every fraud could be
charged as some form of theft. Federal law abounds with instances where
the same course of thievery is chargeable under multiple statutes, some of
which are called frauds, and some of which are traditional theft-like of-
fenses.34 Second, even if it were possible to draw a meaningful distinction
between thefts and frauds, it would only be useful to do so in writing sen-
tencing guidelines if the objective were to generate different sentencing
outcomes for the two categories of cases. However, the sentencing range
under both the theft and fraud guidelines is driven almost entirely by loss
amount, and the loss tables in the two guidelines are virtually identical.
Therefore, unless the term loss means something different in theft and
fraud cases, application of either section 2Bl.1 or section 2F1.1 to the
same set of facts will customarily produce either the identical sentencing
range, or a pair of ranges so close that the top of one will approach, or
even overlap, the bottom of the other. 35 Because the fraud Guideline es-
sentially adopts the loss definition from the theft Guideline, this is exactly
what happens. Thus, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the existence
of separate fraud and theft Guidelines is merely a pointless duplication.
Third, the existence of separate theft and fraud Guidelines is mischie-
vous. Sections 2Bl.1 and 2F1.1, and their respective commentaries re-
garding loss, are slightly different, albeit for reasons that are not easy to
discern. Consequently, creative litigants and judges try to impute meaning
into the differences, which only leads to confusion.
36
driven concept. United States v. Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 1997).
33 Federal Judicial Center 1996 Survey on Sentencing Guidelines (1997).
34 See Bowman, supra note 14, at 490-92 (discussing the illusory character of the theft-fraud
distinction in federal law).
35 The Sentencing Table is constructed so that the top of one sentencing range will overlap the
bottom of the range two offense levels higher. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (2000).
36 See the series of Third Circuit cases beginning with United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521 (3d
Cir. 1991), running through United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d (3d Cir. 1992), United States v.
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There now appears to be little or no dissent from the view that the
theft and fraud guidelines should be consolidated. A consolidated eco-
nomic crimes guideline was part of the former Commission's economic
crime package.37 The CLC has supported consolidation since 1997.38 Pro-
bation officers would welcome it,3 9 and neither the Justice Department nor
the Practitioners Advisory Group (the official advisory body representing
the defense bar in Commission matters) has expressed opposition to the
principle of consolidation.
B. The Loss Conundrum
Sadly, the apparent consensus on consolidating sections 2Bl.1 and
2F 1.1 brings us no closer to penetrating the central mystery of federal eco-
nomic crime sentencing-the conundrum of loss. Why is loss such a
problem? No one disputes the notion that stealing more is worse than
stealing less. Similarly, almost no one disagrees with the basic judgment at
the heart of the current economic crime guidelines that the sentences of
thieves and swindlers should be determined in some significant part by the
magnitude of the economic deprivations they caused or intended. 40 Where
the Commission has fallen short is in the translation of a sound funda-
mental intuition into a just, doctrinally coherent, easy-to-apply set of rules.
The root of the loss problem is that the Guidelines do not now contain
a meaningful definition of the term. The descriptive commentary regarding
loss following sections 2BI.1 and 2Fl.1 includes a series of directives
which neither singly nor together amount to a coherent definition. (The
various sections of Guidelines commentary addressing loss from sections
2B 1.1 and 2F 1.1 of the current Guidelines are drawn together in Appendix
B to this Article.) The basic definition of loss announced in the theft
guideline41 and adopted by reference into the fraud guideline42-"the value
of the property taken, damaged, or destroyed"-uses the language of lar-
ceny. The word 'taken' is a term of art, denoting to any Anglo-American
Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995), and United States v. Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304 (1996).
37 63 Fed. Reg., No. 3, Pt. II (Jan. 6, 1998).
38 See Gilbert, supra note 9 (statement by then-Chair of CLC Sentencing Guidelines Subcom-
mittee endorsing a common definition of loss in both theft and fraud cases).
39 Fred S. Tryles, A Critique of the Operation of the Theft and Fraud Guidelines from the Per-
spective of One Probation Officer, 10 FED. SENT. REP. 131 (1997).
40 There is, however, disagreement over the degree to which numeric measurements of eco-
nomic harm should drive economic crime sentences. At the symposium from which this issue of the
George Mason Law Review took its genesis, Senior Judge Jon Newman of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit gave voice to the view of a number of conference participants that the
influence of loss amount on sentence length should be substantially decreased. Judge Newman has
since embodied his argument in an article. Jon 0. Newman, Toward Guidelines Simplification, 13 FED.
SENT. REP. - (2000) (forthcoming).
41 U.S.S.G. § 2BI.I, app. note 2 (2000).
42 U.S.S.G. § 2FL.I, app. note 8 (2000).
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criminal lawyer the "taking" element of common law larceny, with its in-
sistence on a transfer of possession of moveable personalty.43 Outside the
limited context of simple larceny-like offenses, this definition is virtually
useless. For example, if 'taken' retains some vestige of its common law
meaning, when is property 'taken' in a wire fraud or a check kite or a
bankruptcy fraud or an insider trading case? And how? And from whom?
Alternatively, if 'taken' is intended to invoke no particular doctrinal asso-
ciation, what does it mean?
Aside from the larceny-based core definition, perhaps the most glar-
ing defect in the current loss rules is their treatment of causation. When we
ask what the loss is in any particular case, we are really asking two ques-
tions about causation: First, what economic harms resulted from defen-
dant's conduct? Second, which among the harms the defendant caused in
fact should count in law in setting his sentence? The guidelines relating to
these questions and the cases construing them have created a puzzling
patchwork, which so far as can be discerned, looks roughly like this:
1. The relevant conduct guideline, section lB1.3, mandates a broad
measurement of harm, saying that offense levels are to be determined
based on "all harms resulting from" a defendant's own conduct, and thus
apparently sets up a rule of pure 'but for' causation. 44
2. By contrast, both the fraud and theft guidelines define loss nar-
rowly as the 'thing taken,' the corpus delicti of the crime.45
3. Moreover, section 2F1.1, Application Note 8(c), says only 'direct
damages' count, and excludes 'consequential damages.' Both these terms
are drawn from contract law and are difficult, if not impossible, to apply in
the criminal context. 46 If 'consequential damages' is given its customary
contract law meaning, Note 8(c) excludes from loss even economic harms
which are directly caused by defendant's conduct and foreseeable by
him.4
7
4. On the other hand, in cases of procurement fraud and product sub-
stitution, section 2F 1.1, Application Note 8(c), specifically includes in loss
43 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 32.04, at 510 (2d ed. 1995).
44 U.S.S.G. § IBI.3 (2000).
45 U.S.S.G. §§ 2BI.I, n.2, 2Fl.I, n.8 (2000).
46 For a complete discussion of the problems created by the importation into the Guidelines of
the contract terms "direct damages" and "consequential damages," see Bowman, Coping With "Loss,"
supra note 14, at 511-22.
47 The modem test for whether some alleged economic harm caused by a breach of contract is
classified as a "consequential damage" is whether the harm was reasonably foreseeable to the breach-
ing party. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-4 (Damages
for Breach of Warranty Consequential Damages) 564 (4th ed. 1995), A. CORBN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1010, at 79 (1964); see also U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1995) (stating that a defendant would be
liable for "any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at
the time of contracting had reason to know.") If a harm to a contract plaintiff was reasonably foresee-
able to the breaching defendant, then it is ordinarily recoverable by the plaintiff absent some special
contractual provision excluding such recovery. U.C.C. § 2-715, cmt. 3 (1995).
[VOL. 9:2
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the 'consequential damages' elsewhere excluded, if the loss is 'foresee-
able. 48
5. Likewise, under the relevant conduct rules, section 1B1.3, if a de-
fendant has co-conspirators or other criminal cohorts, he is responsible for
all harms that resulted from all of their "reasonably foreseeable acts and
omissions" in furtherance of the crime.49
6. In loan fraud cases, pursuant to section 2F1.1, Application Note
8(b), the loss to banks caused by a drop in value of pledged collateral is a
part of the loss, regardless of whether it was foreseeable and despite the
fact that such a loss is a classic 'consequential damage.'
50
7. Except in loan fraud cases, if a victim's loss is genuinely attribut-
able to several causes, there is no rule for determining what the causal
nexus to a defendant's conduct must be before the loss should be counted.
This patchwork of causation describes only some of the problems
with measuring losses actually incurred, and deals not at all with the oddi-
ties of the Guidelines' treatment of loss in wholly or partially completed
offenses.
In short, in place of a coherent definition of a concept central to the
sentencing of more than one-fifth of all federal defendants,51 the Guide-
lines present us with a jumble of rules about what loss means in particular
situations. This jumble developed piecemeal over the first decade of
Guideline experience, with issues addressed as they were encountered.
Until recently, there was no occasion for a comprehensive review of the
issues presented by the loss cases, nor an initiative to mold the insights
gained from experience into a coherent whole that attempted to account for
how the loss concept fits into a scheme of punishment for economic crime.
In the absence of clearly articulated central organizing principles, it is
hardly surprising that the various rules announced over time do not mesh
very well. Given that the Guidelines do not presently contain a coherent,
workable definition of loss, how should loss be defined?
II. EXPLAINING THE CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE'S DRAFT DEFINITION
OF 'Loss'
Any effort to redefine loss risks replicating earlier mistakes if those
involved in the process fail to identify core principles, or having identified
such principles, fail to adhere to them in drafting particular rules. Con-
48 U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 n.8(c) (2000).
49 U.S.S.G. § 1BI.3 (2000).
50 U.S.S.G. § 2F1.I n.8(b) (2000).
51 In 1999, of the 55,408 offenders sentenced in the federal courts, roughly 11,000 were sen-
tenced for the offenses of fraud, larceny, embezzlement, burglary, or robbery, all of which involve
calculations of loss amount under the applicable guidelines. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 13, at 12,
tbl. 3.
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versely, if we can agree on the core principles and keep them in mind as
we consider particular problems, the particular problems will be fairly easy
to resolve. Therefore, before discussing the details of the CLC proposal on
the definition of 'loss,' we will consider certain fundamentals.
A. Loss and Punishment of Economic Crime
In general, the criminal law imposes punishment when a defendant
has been found culpable either for causing or intending to cause harm to
another person or to society. The seriousness of a criminal offense is the
product of several factors, including the degree of harm caused or in-
tended, the culpable mental state of the defendant, and (in the case of
completed offenses) the causal relationship between the defendant's ac-
tions and the harm caused. The Guidelines impose increasing levels of
punishment as the Offense Level (a numerical measurement of offense
seriousness) increases. In economic crimes, the type of harm caused or
intended is customarily pecuniary (though other types of harm can result
from predominantly economic crime). Consequently, the largest compo-
nent in the Offense Level calculation for economic crimes is loss.
At the risk of oversimplifying somewhat, the loss figure is designed
to serve as the primary measure (or, at the least, one of the primary meas-
ures) of offense seriousness in economic crimes. It performs its role in
slightly different ways depending on whether the crime was a completed
offense, a partially completed offense, or a wholly inchoate offense such
as an attempt or unsuccessful conspiracy. In completed offenses, loss pro-
vides both a direct measurement of harm to victims and a proxy measure-
ment of the defendant's culpable mental state. 52 First, the larger the vic-
tim's economic loss, the greater the harm caused. Second, a defendant who
steals a large amount is usually thought to be more blameworthy than one
who steals only a small sum, both because the intention to cause a large
harm is more blameworthy than an intention to cause a smaller one, and
because a successful scheme to steal a large amount generally involves
longer planning and premeditation. Therefore, in completed offenses, a
larger loss should, in general, be punished more severely than a smaller
loss.
In inchoate offenses, 'intended loss' serves as a direct measurement
of culpable mental state and as an important indicator of the degree of risk
of actual harm posed by the defendant's conduct. Whatever the context, it
is fair to say most observers have concluded that loss is, first and foremost,
a quantitative measurement of the pecuniary harm that the defendant either
caused or intended.
52 See generally, Bowman, supra note 14, at 497-503.
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B. Causation
Even in completed offenses, the simple equivalency between pecuni-
ary harm inflicted and offense seriousness becomes more complex when
the defendant's criminal conduct caused economic harms that the defen-
dant did not specifically desire (even though he may have realized that
they might well result), or from which he did not personally benefit. For
example, a defendant in a fraudulent loan application case, hopeful that his
'ship would come in' in time to make repayment, may not have intended
that the bank lose its loan money. Or the author of a telemarketing scheme
might not intend that his elderly victims lose their homes as a result of
losing their retirement savings to the telemarketer. In these and many other
cases, whether the defendant is to be held culpable for particular economic
losses to victims, and thus whether the loss number and perhaps his of-
fense level may be increased, will depend on the legal question of causa-
tion. In other words, was the causal link between the defendant's conduct
and the economic harm that resulted sufficiently direct that the law should
hold the defendant responsible and increase his punishment accordingly?
The literature of criminal law, contracts, and torts usually conceives
of causation problems as having two components, customarily labeled
cause-in-fact and legal cause.53 Cause-in-fact is about determining the
causal relationship between a defendant's act and a subsequent harm to
another.5 4 It asks whether the conduct truly was a part of the chain of
events in the physical world that brought about the harm. Legal cause asks
a different question: Assuming that the defendant's conduct truly did play
a role in bringing about the harm, is it just to impose legal liability for the
harm concededly caused?55 For example, a hiker who dislodges a pebble
on a mountainside may start an avalanche that obliterates a village below.
Cause-in-fact is concerned only with the issue of whether the dislodged
pebble started the avalanche. Legal cause is about whether, assuming that
the pebble did cause the slide, the hiker should, as a matter of law, be held
accountable and punished for the destruction of the village and the death of
the villagers.
In both civil and criminal law, the most common causation standard is
'reasonable foreseeability.' 56 To a certain extent, the familiar reasonable
foreseeability standard commingles the analytically distinct questions of
cause-in-fact and legal cause. That is, under a reasonable foreseeability
standard, a defendant will be held civilly liable or criminally culpable for
53 For an extended discussion of the problem of causation in economic crime sentencing, as well
as the relationship of thinking about causation in other areas of the law to this problem, see Bowman,
supra note 14, at 527-36.
54 Id.at530-31.
55 ld. at 532-36.
56 Id.
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harms that (1) were caused in fact by defendant's conduct, in the sense that
they would not have occurred but for defendant's conduct, and (2) were, at
the time of defendant's illegal conduct, foreseeable to a reasonable person
in defendant's position. At present, the Guidelines do not address the issue
of causation of loss, except indirectly. 7
C. The CLC's Core Definition of 'Actual Loss'
During the past four years, a broad consensus has emerged on two
points: (1) that the basic definition of actual loss should specify the re-
quired causal connection between the defendant's criminal conduct and the
economic harms to be counted in loss, and (2) that the causation standard
for actual loss under the Guidelines should express the idea that defendants
should be held responsible for harms that would not have occurred but for
a defendant's conduct and that were reasonably foreseeable to him. The
CLC proposal expresses this consensus. The judges propose that 'actual
loss' be defined as follows:
'Actual loss' means the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted or will result
from the conduct for which the defendant is accountable under section 1B.3 (Relevant
Conduct).
'Reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm' means pecuniary harm that the defendant knew
or, under the circumstances of the particular case, reasonably should have known likely
would result in the ordinary course of events from the conduct for which the defendant is
accountable under section lB 1.3 (Relevant Conduct).
58
57 See supra notes 44-51 & accompanying text, describing the patchwork treatment of causation
implied by current guidelines provisions, including the relevant conduct Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3,
and inclusion of the contracts term 'consequential damages' in U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, n.8(c).
58 See CLC Draft, § 2(A), infra App. A. The 2001 Staff Draft incorporates the CLC language as
§ 2A (Option 1). 2001 Staff Draft, supra note 11.
The April 1998 draft definition of 'reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm' used in the 1998
field test read as follows: "'Reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm' means pecuniary harm that the
defendant knew, or under the circumstances of the particular case, should have known would likely
follow, in the ordinary course of events, as a result of that conduct." Field Test, supra note 6. The CLC
draft makes only minor clarifying changes to the April 1998 draft. The CLC draft adds the word 'rea-
sonably' before the phrase 'should have known.' It also eliminates some redundancy in the April 1998
version by substituting the phrase "likely would result, in the ordinary course of events, from that
conduct," for the original "would likely follow, in the ordinary course of events, as a result of that
conduct." Compare CLC Draft, § 2(A), infra App. A, with Field Test § 2(A), supra note 6 (emphasis
added) (Apr. 1998 draft).
The CLC draft improves on the April 1998 field test draft in at least one additional respect.
The April 1998 draft used the phrase 'that conduct' without saying which conduct is referred to. This is
not a big substantive issue because the reader of the April 1998 draft will quickly deduce that the
'conduct' is the conduct alluded to in the definition of 'actual loss.' However, any imprecision has
been cleared up by amending the April 1998 draft to add language tracking the 'actual loss' definition:
'Reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm' means pecuniary harm that the defendant knew, or under the
[VOL. 9:2
HeinOnline  -- 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 462 2000-2001
A JUDICIOUS SOLUTION
Despite the broad consensus in favor of defining actual loss in terms
of pecuniary harms reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, there are dis-
senting views, which are considered below.
1. Leaving Causation Undefined Is Not a Viable Option
It has occasionally been suggested that placing a causation standard in
the loss definition is just too troublesome, and thus we should maintain the
status quo by omitting any reference to cause. Putting it as mildly as possi-
ble, this is not a tenable option. No coherent definition of loss is possible
without a specification of the required causal nexus between the crime and
economic harms that are to be counted as loss. Even if the Commission
were to ignore the question of causation, courts construing the economic
crime Guidelines do not have that luxury. The causation issue is latent in
every loss determination, and is the pivotal question in many cases.
59
Moreover, a well-defined causation standard not only provides the imme-
diate rule of decision in some number of cases, but serves as the central
organizing principle against which special rules governing particular loss
measurement problems should be measured. It would be irresponsible of
the Commission to promulgate a purportedly reformed definition of loss
that gave courts no guidance on so central an issue.
2. Reasonable Foreseeability Is the Best Available Causation Stan-
dard
There are those who, while conceding that some causal standard is
doubtless necessary, remain skeptical of the particular standard-'but for'
causation plus reasonable foreseeability-that has emerged over the past
circumstances of the particular case reasonably should have known, likely would result, in the ordinary
course of events, from the conduct for which the defendant is accountable under § I B 1.3 (Relevant
Conduct). CLC Draft, infra App. A, § 2(A).
59 See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 217 F.3d 1038, 1048 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 518279 (employing proximate cause analysis to determine loss); United States v. Neadle,
72 F.3d 1104 (3d Cir. 1995), amended by, 79 F.3d 14 (1996) (discussing the necessary causal connec-
tion between the conduct of a defendant who lied about the undercapitalization of his insurance com-
pany and insurance losses sustained in the wake of Hurricane Hugo). See also United States v. Yea-
man, 194 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting zero loss where defendant's misrepresentations had 'but
for' causal connection to loss); United States v. Green, 114 F.3d 613 (7th Cir. 1997) (charging nurse
who created false bills as part of insurance fraud scheme with entire loss, including payments for pain
and suffering, because insurance settlements are customarily based on size of medical bills); United
States v. Copus, 110 F.3d 1529 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding in loan fraud case that loss limited to pecuni-
ary harm attributable to false statement); United States v. Cheng, 96 F.3d 654 (2d Cir. 1996) (whole-
saler who accepted food stamps from restaurants caused loss); United States v. Krenning, 93 F.3d 1257
(5th Cir. 1996) (finding district court's method of valuing loss bore no reasonable relation to harm
from fraud); United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1991) (suggesting proximate cause analy-
sis).
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four years and is now embodied in the CLC proposal. 6° The most obvious
rejoinder to this skepticism is to inquire what alternative standard the
skeptics would prefer. To this question there has, to date, been no re-
sponse. Careful analysis of the competing alternatives provides an expla-
nation for the silence. On the one hand, a pure 'but for' causation standard
would be too inclusive. Chains of cause and effect run on infinitely
through time. To hold a defendant criminally responsible for every adverse
pecuniary consequence of his wrongdoing, no matter how remote or un-
foreseeable, plainly would be unfair to the defendant.
Conversely, limiting loss to intended economic harms that the defen-
dant consciously desired would be too restrictive a measurement of offense
seriousness. If a corporate treasurer embezzles company funds to speculate
in futures trading or to place bets at the dog track, he may not intend to
deprive the company of the money. He may honestly intend to make good
his defalcations, with interest, but when the orange crop freezes or the
dogs don't run, his good intentions do not reduce the company's financial
loss and should not reduce the corporate treasurer-turned-defendant's sen-
tence. When the owner of a business starts kiting checks to tide over cash
flow problems, he may hope that his business will turn a corner and all the
checks can be made good. But when the business does not turn the corner
and the kite collapses leaving banks holding hundreds of thousands of
dollars of worthless paper, the economic harm to the banks is not lessened
by the defendant's unfounded optimism. When a real estate swindler lies
to the bank financing a development, to his partners, to purchasers of the
lots, and to contractors working on the project, he may intend to steal for
himself only a small fraction of the money and resources invested in the
project. But the entirely predictable result of his crimes may be the col-
lapse of the undertaking and financial harm to the bank, his partners, the
purchasers, and the contractors far in excess of the personal gain on which
the swindler's attention was focused. Similarly, if a con man convinces an
old woman to borrow against the equity in her home to invest in worthless
stock, and as a result the woman loses both her investment and her home,
the economic harm to the woman is both the money the defendant intended
to steal for himself and the additional financial losses the victim suffered
in consequence of the foreclosure of her home.
In short, limiting actual loss to the amount subjectively intended by
the defendant does not accurately measure the economic harm caused by
60 This line of thinking would seem to be the impetus behind section 2(A) (Option 2) in the
Commission Staff proposal published in January 2001. See 2001 Staff Draft, supra note 11. The staff
offers the option of defining 'actual loss' as "the pecuniary harm that resulted or will result from the
conduct for which the defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). Id. The commen-
tary accompanying Option 2 states that the purpose of this option would be to "make clear 'but for'
causation is required but without concept of reasonable foreseeability." Id.
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the defendant's crimes, and it permits the defendant to limit his sentencing
exposure by making difficult-to-disprove claims about his benevolent in-
tentions or about his failure to consider the likely consequences of his
crime. A proper causation standard for loss will thus lie somewhere be-
tween the purely objective standard of 'but for' causation and a purely
subjective inquiry into the defendant's intentions. The CLC definition fits
this bill. It insists, as a minimum, that a defendant's criminal conduct (or
the foreseeable conduct of his criminal partners) must be a cause-in-fact of
the economic harm at issue. However, it limits the defendant's sentencing
liability to those losses that a reasonable person should have foreseen.
3. The Criminal Law Traditionally Imposes Punishments for Rea-
sonably Foreseeable Harms Caused by a Defendant's Criminal
Conduct
It has been suggested from time to time that holding defendants
criminally responsible for reasonably foreseeable harms caused by their
illegal conduct is some sort of radical innovation. In fact, exactly the re-
verse is true. The concept of foreseeability has long been a staple of analy-
sis both in determining guilt and in imposing sentences.6' Foreseeability is
expressly an element of crimes where the prohibited mental state is crimi-
nal negligence 62 and even the most aggravated degrees of recklessness. 63 It
is also integral to determinations of guilt for crimes in which the ostensible
mens rea involves intentionality or knowledge. 64 For example, a party to a
conspiracy is responsible for any crime committed by a co-conspirator if it
is within the scope of the conspiracy, or is a foreseeable consequence of
the unlawful agreement.65 In cases of accomplice liability, an accomplice
61 The notion of causation runs throughout the law-including the criminal law-and it is gen-
erally understood to encompass two concepts. A defendant's conduct must generally be both the 'cause
in fact' and the 'proximate cause' of some harm before liability is imposed. United States v. Neadle, 72
F.3d 1104, 1119 (3d Cir. 1996) (Becker, J., concurring and dissenting).
62 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.02(2)(d) (defining criminal negligence to require that
defendant should have been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm).
63 See, e.g., Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1977) (finding foreseeability of death a
necessary component of depraved indifference murder under New York law); Regina v. Cunningham,
2 Q.B. 396 (1957) (holding that 'malice' under the Offenses against the Person Act, 1861, embraces
both intentional and reckless conduct and recklessness requires evidence that defendant foresaw the
threatened injury).
64 See, e.g., People v. Rakusz, 484 N.Y.S.2d 784 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (finding defendant guilty
of assault, defined as: "with intent to prevent.., a police officer... from performing a lawful duty, he
causes physical injury to [the officer], when an officer frisked a struggling defendant and cut his hand
on the knife, because the injury was foreseeable to defendant"); State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145
(Wis. 1986) (holding that a defendant "subjects a child" to abuse if, by act or omission, "she causes the
child to come within the influence of a foreseeable risk of cruel maltreatment").
65 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946). See also United States v. Lauren-
zana, 113 F.3d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 1997) (defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit mail fraud where he
enters scheme in which it is reasonably foreseeable that mails will be used).
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"is guilty not only of the offense he intended to facilitate or encourage, but
also of any reasonably foreseeable offense committed by the person he
aids and abets., 66 The felony-murder rule, which imposes liability for the
highest available degree of criminal homicide for killings occurring during
certain dangerous felonies, in effect substitutes foreseeability of death for
the intent to cause it.
67
Foreseeability of harm is also widely employed as a determinant of
the harms to be considered in sentencing. The Guidelines themselves re-
peatedly use foreseeability as the dividing line between those harms which
count for measuring offense seriousness and those which do not.68 Inclu-
sion of reasonably foreseeable harms in the criminal sentencing calculus
has received the imprimatur of the United States Supreme Court, even in
the capital sentencing context. In Payne v. Tennessee,69 the Court approved
the use of victim impact evidence over the objection that such evidence
concerns "factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that were
irrelevant to the decision to kill," and thus had nothing to do with the
"blameworthiness of a particular defendant." 70 Justice Souter, in his con-
currence, responded to this line of argument by observing that the harms to
the surviving victims of homicide (the families, friends, communities, and
loved ones of the deceased) portrayed in victim impact evidence are mor-
ally, and therefore legally, relevant precisely because they are so plainly
foreseeable.71
66 People v. Croy, 710 P.2d 392, 398 n.5 (Cal. 1985). See generally, DRESSLER, supra note 43, §
30.05[B][5] at 443.
67 Some jurisdictions apply the felony murder rule to all deaths caused in fact by the commission
of designated dangerous felonies, on the theory that such felonies always present a particular risk of
death. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW, § 7.5(b), at 624-25 (2d ed.
1986). Other jurisdictions impose a specific requirement that the death in the particular case have been
a foreseeable outcome of defendant's felony. Id. § 7.5(d) at 626-27.
68 See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a) (dictating that sentencing be based on harms resulting from the
foreseeable conduct of defendant's criminal partners); U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, n.8(c) (including in loss
foreseeable consequential damages in procurement fraud and product substitution cases). See also
U.S.S.G. § 2F1I., n.10(a) (authorizing a departure for 'reasonably foreseeable non-monetary harm'),
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, n.10(c) (authorizing departure for 'reasonably foreseeable' physical, psychological,
or emotional harm). See also United States v. Samo, 73 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding all losses on
fraudulently procured loan attributable to the defendant even where the default was not his fault be-
cause it was reasonably foreseeable from the defendant's conduct that the loan would be approved,
putting the bank's money at risk).
69 501 U.S. 808 (1990).
70 Id. at 818 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504, 505 (1987)).
71 Said Justice Souter:
Murder has foreseeable consequences. . . . Every defendant knows, if
endowed with the mental competence for criminal responsibility, that
the life he will take by his homicidal behavior is that of a unique person,
like himself, and that the person to be killed probably has close associ-
ates, 'survivors,' who will suffer harms and deprivations from the vic-
tim's death .... The foreseeability of the killing's consequences imbues
them with direct moral relevance, . . . and evidence of the specific harm
caused when a homicidal risk is realized is nothing more than evidence
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4. A Reasonable Foreseeability Standard Requires an Assessment
of the Defendant's Blameworthiness for the Economic Harms He
Caused
Some Guidelines critics (including a number who participated in the
Symposium) have complained that the heavy influence of the loss calcula-
tion on sentence length elevates an accounting exercise over more refined
considerations of the defendant's state of mind, and ultimately of his
blameworthiness.72 In my view, this criticism has always been somewhat
misconceived because loss, however defimed, is always a rough proxy
measurement of a defendant's guilty mind, at least insofar as we can agree
that a plan to steal a lot is more blameworthy than one to steal a little.
Moreover, the CLC definition of loss represents an improvement over the
status quo precisely because it requires a judicial judgment about a defen-
dant's fault for identified harms. It is unjust to put someone in prison for
harms he neither intended nor could reasonably have anticipated would
follow from his choice to do wrong. It is entirely appropriate, however, to
punish based on harms that would not have occurred but for the defen-
dant's evil choices, and which the defendant either anticipated or could
and should have anticipated. The CLC's reasonable foreseeability standard
obliges the sentencing court to consider the facts of the case from the per-
spective of a reasonable person in defendant's situation when it separates
harms for which a defendant ought justly to be punished from those for
which he should not.
5. The CLC Loss Definition Will Not Generate Excessive Litiga-
tion
Some have worried that defining actual loss as the pecuniary harms
caused by the crime and reasonably foreseeable to the defendant will
"generate excessive litigation."73 While one understands the caution be-
of the risk that the defendant originally chose to run despite the kinds of
consequences that were obviously foreseeable.
Id. at 838-39 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
In dissent, Justice Stevens tacitly concedes that impact on surviving victims would be relevant
if foreseeable. His argument is simply that the majority's holding "permits a jury to sentence a defen-
dant to death because of harm to the victim and his family that the defendant could not foresee, which
was not even identified until after the crime had been committed, and which may be deemed by the
jury, without any rational explanation, to justify a death sentence in one case and not in another." Id. at
863 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
72 See the comments of Judge Jon Newman of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit, and others, at the Second Plenary Session of the Third Symposium on Crime and Punish-
ment in the United States, Oct. 12, 2000, available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/
symposium.htm.
73 See the comments of several participants in Concurrent Breakout Session, Group One, Third
Symposium on Crime and Punishment in the United States, Oct. 12, 2000, available at
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hind this concern, the concern itself seems largely unwarranted. To begin,
the fear of 'excessive' litigation objection implies that the meaning and
application of current guidelines and case law on loss is so clear and
well-settled that there is not presently much litigation in this area, which is
of course patent nonsense. Any more-than-trivial change in sentencing law
'generates' an initial burst of litigation in the period immediately following
its adoption. However, if that is thought an insuperable obstacle to re-
forming the law, then no new law should ever be passed. The real question
is whether, after the initial burst of litigation activity, the new rules will be
better than the old rules. A comparison of the CLC proposal with current
guidelines provisions on loss yields a high degree of confidence that the
new rules would indeed be better, simpler, more workable, than the old.
Finally, those with lingering reservations about a cause-based defini-
tion of loss should derive considerable reassurance from the fact that two
separate groups of federal judges-the participants in the 1998 field test
and the CLC-have overwhelmingly endorsed the basic loss definition
contained in the CLC proposal.74 Above all other groups, federal judges
can be relied upon to embrace simplifying reforms and to recognize and
reject proposals that promise to generate nonessential litigation. As will be
discussed in the next section, the CLC proposal on loss contains not only a
cause-based core definition, but also and significantly, a series of provi-
sions limiting the categories of reasonably foreseeable harms to be in-
cluded in loss.
D. Restrictions on Categories of Reasonably Foreseeable Harms Includ-
able In Loss
The CLC was not oblivious to the fact that some foreseeable conse-
quences of criminal conduct ought not to be included in the definition of
loss. Accordingly, the CLC proposal, in common with its 1998 predeces-
sor, contains significant limitations on the scope of those reasonably fore-
seeable harms that can be included in the loss calculation.
http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/symposium.htm.
74 The CLC voted unanimously to forward its proposed loss redefinition to the Commission for
publication. The response of judges participating in the 1998 field test was similarly enthusiastic. The
Commission gathered 22 federal judges and 21 probation officers and asked them to apply the existing
loss definition and a less-refined version of the current proposal to a selection of randomly selected and
self-selected cases, and then to compare the results. (The loss definition used in the Field Test was the
so-called "April 1998 Draft" loss re-definition. Its core definition of loss was nearly identical to the
CLC draft. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.) Of the forty-three participants, all but two
judges and one probation officer found the new definition logically organized and easy to follow. And
as the Commission later reported, "the near-universal consensus among both judges and probation
officers was the proposed definition was preferable to the current formulation." See Field Test, supra
note 6.
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1. Loss Includes Only Pecuniary Harms
The injuries to victims of theft, fraud, and other 'economic' crimes
are not necessarily limited to economic harm. Victims may suffer emo-
tional harm, damage to reputation, disruption of personal or business rela-
tionships, or even physical illness. Because harms of this sort are often
foreseeable to defendants, one might, as the economists say, 'monetize'
non-economic harms by assigning monetary values to injuries such as
emotional distress (as courts and juries do routinely in civil lawsuits) and
include the resulting figures in loss. There is no support in the CLC for
including non-economic harms in loss. The CLC proposal specifically
excludes non-economic harms by defining loss to include only 'pecuniary
harms.' 
7 5
2. The CLC Excludes from Loss Foreseeable Investigative Costs of
the Government, and Costs Incurred by Victims in Aiding the
Government
One of the foreseeable consequences of crime is that the government
will investigate and prosecute those offenses of which it becomes aware. It
is also foreseeable that victims of crime will assist the investigation.
Criminal investigations and prosecutions cost money. Thus, one might
include in loss the foreseeable costs of investigating and prosecuting the
defendant's crimes. However, there is virtually universal agreement that
such costs should not affect sentence length.76 First, the amount of money
the government spends to investigate and prosecute a case often depends
on fortuitous factors unrelated to the seriousness of the offense or the de-
fendant's overall blameworthiness--considerations such as the thorough-
ness of the investigators, the number and location of witnesses, whether
expert witnesses or specialized forensic techniques are required, and so
forth. Second, even if investigative costs could be shown to bear some
rough relationship to offense seriousness or defendant culpability, the in-
vestment of judicial time and resources necessary to accurately determine
investigative costs would be unlikely to produce commensurate gains in
the accuracy of the loss figure as a measurement of relative culpability
75 Should the Commission wish to make the exclusion of non-economic harms even more ex-
plicit, it could easily do so. I have suggested elsewhere that the guidelines commentary on 'loss' con-
tain language to this effect: "The phrase 'pecuniary harm' is to be given its common meaning. Many
physical and emotional harms, injuries to reputation, etc. can be assigned a monetary value. However,
'loss' does not measure harms of this kind. Its purpose is to measure economic harms." See Bowman,
supra note 14, at 572.
76 No participant in the long series of discussions on revising the loss definition has ever sug-
gested including investigative costs in loss. Both the CLC draft and the 2001 Staff Draft specifically
exclude government investigative costs and costs incurred by victims to assist government investiga-
tions. See CLC Draft, infra App. A, § 2(B)(ii); 2001 Staff Draft, supra note 11, § 2(C)(ii).
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between defendants.
In consequence, the CLC proposal specifically excludes investigative
and prosecution costs from loss. Section 2(b)(ii) states that loss "does not
include . . . [c]osts to the government of, and costs incurred by victims
primarily to aid the government in, the prosecution and criminal investiga-
tion of an offense, even if such costs are reasonably foreseeable. 77
3. The CLC Excludes Interest from Loss
The Guidelines now exclude interest from loss. Application Note 8 to
section 2F 1.1 says that loss "does not.., include interest the victim could
have earned on such funds had the offense not occurred., 78 Nonetheless,
interest has surfaced as a problem because a number of courts of appeals
have (depending on one's point of view) either simply ignored the Guide-
lines or interpreted them creatively in order to include 'bargained-for' in-
terest in lOSS. 79 The CLC considered two approaches to interest: (1) ex-
clude all interest, including both bargained-for and opportunity cost inter-
est, or (2) include interest only in cases in which the promise of a return on
investment was part of the inducement to fraud ('bargained-for' interest).
After considering the arguments outlined below, the CLC decided on a
categorical exclusion of interest of all types from loss.
80
a. Arguments for Inclusion of Interest
Consistency with the core definition of loss suggests inclusion of in-
terest. If a criminal steals money that the victim would otherwise have
loaned to or invested with an honest person or institution, it is reasonably
77 CLC Draft, infra App. A, § 2(B)(ii).
78 U.S.S.G. § 2FI.I, n.8 (2000).
79 See United States v. Sharma, 190 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing 'opportunity cost
interest' from 'bargained-for interest' and including the latter in loss); United States v. Nolan, 136 F.3d
265 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Gilberg, 75 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 1996) (including $726,637 in accrued
mortgage loan interest); United States v. Goodchild, 25 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 1994) (including finance
charges and late fees in loss from unauthorized credit card use); United States v. Henderson, 19 F.3d
917, 928 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Interest should be included if. the victim had a reasonable expectation of
receiving interest from the transaction."); United States v. Jones, 933 F.2d 353, 354-55 (6th Cir. 1991)
(finding interest should be included where defrauded credit card companies had reasonable expectation
of specific return on credit extended); cf., United States v. Allender, 62 F.3d 909, 917 (7th Cir. 1995)
(overruling U.S. v. Clemmons, 48 F.3d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 1995), and finding loss includes bar-
gained-for interest); United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1423 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating in dictum
that loss does not include interest); United States v. Lowder, 5 F.3d 467, 471 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding
interest should be included where defendant promised victims a specific interest rate).
The Fourth Circuit excludes interest categorically. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419
(4th Cir. 1994). See also United States v. Allen, 88 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 1996).
80 The CLC proposal would exclude from loss: "Interest of any kind, finance charges, late fees,
penalties, anticipated profits, or amounts based upon an agreed-upon rate of return." CLC Draft, infra
App. A, § 2(B)(i).
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foreseeable that the victim will lose not only his principal, but also the
time value of that money. Loss of the time value of money is, from an
economic point of view, indisputably a harm suffered by the victim of a
fraud. But the consistency argument proves too much. If we are to include
in loss the time value of stolen money, then consistency dictates that we
include time value not only when the defendant defrauds a victim by
promising payment of interest, but also when he promises a return on in-
vestment in the form of dividends, capital gains, or profits. A defendant's
sentence should not turn on the fortuity of the name used to characterize
the promised return on investment. Likewise, a victim suffers the harm of
lost time value of his money even if the scheme is one that involves no
promise of return on investment. For example, an insurance company de-
frauded by an insured who torches his own business and then collects fire
insurance proceeds is deprived of the time value of the insurance payout
no less than it would be if the company had lost the same amount by in-
vesting it with a crooked stock broker who falsely promised a high rate of
return.
b. 'Bargained-for' Interest
Some courts have sought to evade the current prohibition against in-
cluding interest in loss by including interest specifically promised by a
defendant as part of the inducement to the victim to part with his money.
The approach of those courts gives rise to strong theoretical and practical
objections.
First, loss is primarily a measurement of actual harm actually suffered
by the victim, not of the magnitude of the false promises of the crooked
defendant. If a defendant defrauded victim A by promising payment of ten
percent interest monthly, A's actual loss is not his principal plus 120%
annual interest because there was never a realistic possibility that the de-
fendant or anyone else would pay him interest at that rate. The only reli-
able measure of what the victim lost by giving his money to the defendant
rather than investing it with an honest person is the market rate for in-
vested money. (Even this is highly speculative because there is no way of
knowing whether the victim would indeed have invested it.)
Second, using the interest rate promised by defendants creates a dis-
parity of punishment between similarly situated defendants. Three defen-
dants who stole the same amount of money should not receive different
sentences merely because the first falsely promised his victims a fifty per-
cent return, the second promised 100%, and the third committed a form of
fraud (like the arsonist who defrauded his fire insurer in the example
above) that involved no promise of return on investment. Likewise, two
defendants who stole the same amount of money by falsely promising a
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twenty-five percent return on investment should not receive different pun-
ishments because the first characterized the promised payment as interest
while the second happened to call the promised payment dividends.
Third, using different interest rates in every case adds to sentencing
complexity. There will be inevitable disputes over exactly what rate of
return was promised. Particularly in multi-victim fraud cases, it will often
prove that the defendant promised different rates of return to different vic-
tims. In such cases, the court would not only have to make findings about
exactly what was promised each of perhaps dozens or hundreds of victims,
but then someone would have to do the resulting math to arrive at a loss
number.
Courts may have been drawn into including bargained-for interest by
two unarticulated lines of thought. The first is an unconscious reversion to
memories of first-year contracts and the recollection that aggrieved con-
tract litigants are often entitled to the 'benefit of the bargain' as a measure
of damages. 8' But this is not a contracts problem. In contracts, courts are
concerned, not with punishment of the morally blameworthy, but with
enforcement of (primarily commercial) agreements.82 The benefit of the
bargain rule, when it is applicable, focuses on ensuring that the non-
breaching party is disadvantaged as little as possible by the breach of the
agreement, not by measuring moral culpability of the party in breach.
Moreover, even in contracts, the prevailing litigant is only sometimes
entitled to the benefit of his bargain; other measures of damages are as or
more common.
83
The second idea that may lie behind the 'bargained for' interest cases
is the notion that the magnitude of the defendant's false promises is some-
how a proxy measurement for the defendant's blameworthiness. But this is
a false equivalency. A crook who euchres a victim out of $1,000 by falsely
promising a ten percent monthly return is by no rational calculation either
more or less blameworthy than another crook who inveigles the victim into
parting with the same $1,000 with a false promise of a fifteen percent
monthly return. The harm to the victim in both cases is the same, and the
true measure of each defendant's blameworthiness is his settled desire to
cheat the victim of $1,000, rather than the particular false promises he
81 See, e.g., JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 219, at 438 (1974) ("The
purpose of contract law is often stated as the fulfillment of those expectations which have been induced
by the making of a promise. If the promise is breached the legal system protects the expectations by
attempting to place the injured promisee in the position he would have been in had the promise been
performed.").
82 The law of contracts is concerned with the securing and protection of those economic interests
which result from assurances. Id. § 1, at 2.
83 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344, cmt. a (1979) (emphasizing that
securing to a non-breaching promisee the benefit of his bargain is only one of three interests served by
the law of remedies for breach of contract, the other two being reliance and restitution, and that the
relief granted "may not correspond precisely to any of these interests").
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makes in his efforts to do so.
In short, among the competing proposals regarding interest, the 'bar-
gained for' interest option is the least desirable of the lot. 84
c. Arguments for Total Exclusion of Interest
The CLC has concluded that simplicity should trump blind theoretical
consistency, and therefore that interest should be excluded from loss alto-
gether. Including interest introduces the previously-discussed problems of
equity between defendants and of complex calculation, but it does little to
make loss a more accurate measure of relative offense seriousness. Indeed,
particularly if interest is assessed at a standardized market rate,85 the inter-
est component of loss is really a proxy measurement, not of relative of-
fense seriousness, but of the length of time elapsed between the taking of
the money and the date that loss is measured in preparation for sentencing.
For example, assume two defendants each steal $10,000 by the same
means on the same date, but one is sentenced six months and the other
eighteen months after the crime. If loss is measured as of the date of the
sentencing, the defendant sentenced later would have more interest added
to his loss figure and therefore, at least potentially, would receive a longer
sentence. This is an absurd and unjust result.
Even if loss is to be measured at the time of detection,86 then accrued
interest becomes a proxy measurement for the length of time the defendant
evaded detection. This may arguably bear some attenuated relationship to
culpability, but it is a long stretch. At the end of the day, the CLC could
find no convincing reason why courts should expend valuable resources on
quantifying interest as an element of loss when the result of the labor ad-
vances the purposes of sentencing so little. Moreover, excluding interest
eliminates one of the most common of the foreseeable peripheral harms
that would be likely to cause dispute and delay in the sentencing process.
d. The CLC Proposal Regarding Interest
The CLC proposal states that "[i]nterest of any kind, finance charges,
84 Had the CLC proposed including in 'loss' interest of any type, I would have recommended
that the Commission use a standard interest rate for all defendants. This would ameliorate some of the
problems identified above. It would accurately measure the true economic worth of the harm suffered
by victims fraudulently deprived of the time value of their money, and it would eliminate the inequities
created by calculating the sentences of defendants who stole identical amounts based on the fortuity of
the particular false promises they made. Federal law establishes a rate to be paid to litigants in civil
cases in 28 U.S.C. § 1961. If interest in any form were to be added into loss, the simplest, most equita-
ble, and most theoretically sound way of doing so would be to use a standard statutory rate.
85 Id.
86 See infra note 121 and accompanying text (recommending time of detection as the proper
time of measurement for loss).
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late fees, penalties, anticipated profits, or amounts based on an agreed-
upon return or rate of return" shall not be included in loss. 87 Option One of
the Commission's staff draft of January 2001, in common with an earlier
staff draft dated May 1999, goes further and excludes not only interest, but
also 'opportunity costs,' from the loss calculation.88 This provision was
deleted by the Sentencing Subcommittee of the CLC (Subcommittee).
Subcommittee members observed that the phrase 'opportunity costs' is a
technical term drawn not from law, but from economics, and felt that put-
ting a term of art from another discipline into the Guidelines would be, at
the least, risky because such terms can prove to have implications not ob-
vious to the lawyers who adopted them. Moreover, the interaction between
the general rule of including foreseeable harms in loss and a special rule
excluding opportunity costs is likely to generate further confusion.
Moreover, the CLC does not provide for an upward departure based
on the presence of large amounts of interest. 89 The point of excluding in-
terest is that including it produces difficulties in calculation, invites dispa-
rate sentences, and is unlikely to make the resulting loss figure a more
accurate measure of relative culpability. A categorical exclusion produces
substantial gains in simplicity and clarity. Circuit courts have already
proved remarkably adept at slipping interest into loss, even in the face of
the existing prohibition against it. Leaving the back door ajar by putting in
a departure provision risks more of the same. Moreover, it is difficult to
imagine a case where the size of the interest figure would merit a depar-
ture. If such cases exist, the general departure provision of the Guideline
would seem adequate to deal with it.
E. Net vs. Gross Loss: The Problem of Accounting for Things of Value
Transferred to the Victim by the Defendant
1. Current Law
Under current law, the actual loss is the net loss to the victim. The
commentary to the fraud Guideline requires that any loss suffered by a
fraud victim be offset by any value received in the transaction. For exam-
ple, Application Note 8(b) to section 2F1.1 states:
A fraud may involve the misrepresentation of the value of an item that does have some
value (in contrast to an item that is worthless). Where, for example, a defendant fraudu-
87 CLC Draft, infra App. A, § 2(B)(i).
88 2001 Staff Draft, supra note 11, § 2(C)(i) (Option 1); May 1999 Draft, supra note 8.
89 The staff included the presence of a 'substantial amount of interest' as an upward departure
factor. 2001 Staff Draft, supra note 11, § 1 l(A)(iii).
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lently represents that stock is worth $40,000 and the stock is worth only $ 10,000, the loss is
the amount by which the stock is overvalued (i.e. $30,000). In a case in'volving a misrepre-
sentation concerning the quality of a consumer product, the loss is the difference between
the amount paid by the victim for the product and the amount for which the victim could re-
sell the product received.
90
The courts of appeals have made it clear that the Guidelines' insis-
tence on a measurement of net detriment to the victim is not limited to
cases involving misrepresentation of the value of goods. As the Tenth Cir-
cuit has observed, in determining actual loss, "only net loss is considered;
anything received from the defendant in return reduces the actual loss. ' '91
The sentencing court should calculate "net loss by subtracting the value of
what was given to the victim(s) during the course of the transaction from
the value of what was fraudulently taken., 92 In United States v. Barnes,
93
the Ninth Circuit found the sentencing court erred in failing to consider
benefits the defendant provided to a plasma center while fraudulently im-
personating a doctor. The court announced that actual loss must be based
on the "net detriment to the victim, rather than the gross amount of money
that changes hands." 94 The Sixth Circuit has declared, "The [G]uidelines
do require the district court to determine the net loss." 95 The Third Circuit
held that a defendant convicted of mail fraud for deceiving clients by
practicing law without a license must be credited in the loss calculation for
the value of satisfactory legal services rendered.96 The Fifth Circuit has
likewise repeatedly endorsed the view that actual loss is net loss to the
victim. For example, in United States v. Sublett,97 the court vacated the
defendant's sentence in a contracting fraud case where the trial court failed
to give the defendant credit against the loss amount for legitimate services
he provided or intended to provide. "The district court therefore must de-
duct the value of the legitimate services actually provided by [defendant's]
90 U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, app. n.8(a) (2000).
91 United States v. Haddock, 12 F.3d 950, 961 (10th Cir. 1993).
92 United States v. Pappert, 112 F.3d 1073, 1079 (10th Cir. 1997).
93 125 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1997).
94 See also United States v. Harper, 32 F.3d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding actual loss "is a
measure of what the victims of the fraud were actually relieved of," or the net loss to the victim; citing
Haddock, 12 F.3d at 961); United States v. Williams, 111 F.3d 139, 1997 WL 187342 (Table) (9th Cir.
1997) (unpublished disposition) ("Consistent with our prior cases, 'actual loss' under the [G]uidelines
should be measured as the 'net loss' flowing from the defendant's conduct.").
95 United States v. Carroll, 87 F.3d 1315, 1996 WL 266425 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished dispo-
sition). See also United States v. Lavoie, 19 F.3d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir.1994); United States v. Sloman,
909 F.2d 176, 182 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kohlbach, 38 F.3d 832, 840-42 (6th Cir. 1994)
(calculating loss, where defendants fraudulently sold adulterated orange juice containing beet sugar
instead of pure orange juice concentrate, by subtracting wholesale price of beet sugar from price of
orange concentrate, then multiplying by amount of sugar used in the adulterated juice).
96 United States v. Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304, 1311-12 (3d Cir. 1996).
97 124 F.3d 693 (5th Cir. 1997).
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operation under the first contract and those that he intended to provide
under the second contract in its calculation of the loss under section
2F1.l(b)(1)."98
The same net loss rule is universal in check kiting schemes. The in-
variable rule is that the proper measurement of loss in a check kiting case
is the actual loss to the victim bank as reflected by the amount of the over-
draft at the time the kite is detected. 99 A rule that denied credits for money
returned to the victim in the course of a kiting scheme would require the
sentencing court to add up the face amounts of all the dozens or hundreds
of checks that passed through the kited accounts, without subtracting from
that gross amount the deposits into the kited accounts. In other words, a
'gross loss' rule would generate an 'actual loss' dozens or hundreds of
times larger than the actual amount of money the victim bank really lost.
Every court to have considered the issue has rejected such an approach. °°
In short, the prevailing general rule is that actual loss is net loss.
98 Id. at 695. See also United States v. Whitlow, 979 F.2d 1008, 1010-12 (5th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that the loss incurred by consumers to whom defendant fraudulently sold cars with altered odome-
ters was the price paid by the victim to the defendant less the market value of the vehicles as measured
by their resale value). In United States v. Palmer, 122 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 1997), the court upheld
the district court's loss calculation against defendant's complaint that court failed to credit him "for the
value of products received by the victims, refunds, bounced checks, and stop payment orders." The
opinion impliedly conceded that such offsets were proper, but relied on the district court's finding that
"the government, which generated the total loss figure, had done its best to exclude such items from its
calculations." Id. See also United States v. Peterson, 101 F.3d 375, 383-84 (5th Cir. 1996) (agreeing
with the district court that defendant in stock fraud scheme should be credited with amounts paid to
investors as returns, but not with money defendant claimed an intention to repay); United States v.
Krenning, 93 F.3d 1257, 1269 (5th Cir. 1996) ("the focus of the loss calculation should be on the harm
caused to the victim of the fraud," citing with approval, United States v. Orton, 73 F.3d 331, 333 (1 1th
Cir. 1996), in which the Eleventh Circuit adopted a net loss approach to determining loss in Ponzi
schemes).
99 See ROGER W. HAINES, JR, ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 489-91
(WestGroup 2000). The defendant is also entitled to a limited class of immediately available offsets.
United States v. Shaffer, 35 F.3d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding in check kiting scheme that loss is
amount of outstanding bad checks at time of discovery less applicable offsets); United States v. Flow-
ers, 55 F.3d 218, 222 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding loss in check kite is the "gross amount of the loss at the
time of the detection of the fraud, less funds available for offset, and secured collateral"); United States
v. Marker, 871 F. Supp. 1404, 1409 (D. Kan. 1994) (same).
100 For example, in United States v. Frydenlund, 990 F.2d 822, 826 (5th Cir. 1993), a case in
which a failing auto dealership executed a check kiting scheme in order to stay in business, the Fifth
Circuit upheld use of the overdraft amount at the time of detection as the proper loss measurement
saying "the sentencing standard depends on the bank's actual loss." In United States v. Akin, 62 F.3d
700, 702 (5th Cir. 1995), the court reiterated that "the loss from a check-kiting scheme is the value of
the victim's actual loss." Citing Frydenlund, the court went on to "reject the argument that actual loss
should be calculated at a time other than when the kite is discovered." Id. The results in Akin and
Frydenlund are in accord with the view of every other circuit to have considered the issue. See, e.g.,
Shaffer, 35 F.3d at 114; Flowers, 55 F.3d at 220-22; United States v. Mau, 45 F.3d 212 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding loss in check kiting case measured at time of detection); Marker, 871 F. Supp. at 1409 (same).
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2. The CLC Proposal Endorses a Net Approach to Loss
If loss is to have any meaning as a measurement of economic harm to
victims, it must be a measurement of net economic deprivation. There is a
difference, both in terms of culpability and to the victim's fiscal bottom
line, between:
(A) a man who steals my wallet containing $10,000, and
(B) a man who convinces me to give him $10,000 in exchange for stock he
knows to be worth $5,000, and
(C) a man who convinces me to give him $10,000 in exchange for his
promise to pay me $13,000 next Tuesday, but actually pays me only
$8,000 (hoping that this payment will be sufficient to prevent me from
going to the police), and
(D) a man who lies about his assets and convinces me to loan him $10,000
in exchange for an unfulfilled promise to repay the money with interest,
collateralized by a security interest in real property worth $9,000.
In each case, the defendant receives $10,000 of my money, but
(leaving aside considerations of interest) most of us would agree that my
loss in the first case is $10,000, in the second case $5,000, in the third case
$2,000, and in the fourth case $1,000. A useful rule on credits against loss
must account for these and other commonly occurring situations.
The CLC proposal codifies and makes explicit the existing rule that
loss is a net concept. It states as a general rule that loss shall be determined
by excluding the value of the economic benefit the defendant or other per-
sons acting jointly with the defendant transferred to the victim before the
offense was detected.10 In addition, the CLC proposal also addresses three
specific recurring problems in the area of credits against loss: the problem
of investment fraud cases, issues surrounding regulatory offenses and unli-
censed professionals, and credits against loss for items of de minimis value
conveyed to the victim.
a. Investment Fraud Cases
Courts have adopted three different approaches to credits for amounts
returned to the victims of investment schemes with more than one victim
(such as so-called 'Ponzi schemes') in which the defendant repays money
to early victims in order to continue the scheme or avoid detection. The
Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have held that payments made to
Ponzi scheme victims are not deductible from the loss figure.'0 2 The theory
101 CLC Draft, infra App. A, § 2(C)(i).
102 United States v. Deavours, 219 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Loayza, 107 F.3d
257 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Do-
bish, 102 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Mucciante, 21 F.3d 1228 (2d Cir. 1994). At one
point, the Fifth Circuit seemed to be leaning toward the Eleventh Circuit's 'loss to the losing victims'
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of these cases is that a defendant should receive no credit for such pay-
ments because they are a necessary part of the scheme designed to gain the
investors' confidence in order to secure additional investments and to fore-
stall discovery of the scheme. The Seventh Circuit considers the victims as
a class and takes a net loss approach; the loss is the amount taken from the
class of victims by the defendant minus the amount given back to the class
of victims by the defendant. 10 3 The Eleventh Circuit has taken a middle
ground, adopting a 'loss to the losing investors' approach. Under this the-
ory, the loss is the total amount lost by those victims who were out money
at the time of the scheme's discovery. Those investors who received re-
payments in excess of their original investment are not considered 'victims
at all. Therefore, their windfalls are not counted towards reducing the
losses of other investors. 04
The refusal of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits to give
credit for any payments to early investors is troublesome even as an inter-
pretation of the current Guidelines. The reasoning of these courts is even
less persuasive as a guide to what the law should be. First, giving no credit
for repayments runs contrary to the basic 'net loss' approach embodied in
section 2F1.1, Application Notes 8(a) and 8(b), as well as the plentiful
case law endorsing the net loss approach. 10 5 Second, as a matter of policy,
because the function of the loss figure is to measure economic harm to
victims, it must distinguish between greater and lesser harms. A scheme in
which a defendant takes and keeps $10,000 causes more economic harm
than one in which the defendant takes $10,000, but gives back $5,000.
Third, the rationale for the court-created 'Ponzi scheme exception' to
the basic net loss rule-that defendants deserve no credit for payments
made solely to perpetuate the scheme-if written into the Guidelines as a
caveat to the general rule that 'actual loss' is a net concept, would swallow
the general rule and eliminate virtually all credits. 1°6 No defendant truly
bent on fraud confers benefits on his victims out of benevolence or a sense
of sound commercial ethics. Any swindler who can do so will steal with-
out incurring any overhead. Thus, almost all payments and transfers by
defendants to victims are made in some sense to further the success of the
scheme. Consider the four examples from the preceding section. Assume
approach, see United States v. Krenning, 93 F.3d 1257, 1269 (5th Cir. 1996) ("the focus of the loss
calculation should be on the harm caused to the victim of the fraud," citing with approval, United
States v. Orton, 73 F.3d 331, 333 (1 1th Cir. 1996)), but Deavours took a difference course.
103 United States v. Holiusa, 13 F.3d 1043, 1045-46 (7th Cir. 1994).
104 United States v. Orton, 73 F.3d 331 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
105 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
106 The tendency of these investment cases to erode the general net loss principle can be seen in
United States v. Blitz, 151 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 1998), in which the court denied defendant
telemarketers credit for pre-detection refunds and other payments to victims on the ground that such
payments were merely necessary incidents to the execution of the scheme. The court equated such
payments with defendants' payment of their phone bills. Id.
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in each case that the defendant's purpose throughout was to steal. The de-
fendant who steals my wallet with $10,000 in it, of course, gets no credit
because he gave nothing back. The defendant who gave me stock he knew
to be worth only $5,000 in return for my $10,000 would, under a 'per-
petuation' rule, get no credit for the $5,000 because the purpose of giving
it to me was to convince me to part with my money and to avoid criminal
prosecution by giving me something of arguable economic value. Like-
wise, neither the defendant who made a partial payment of $8,000 in order
to dissuade me from going to the police, nor the defendant who pledged
$9,000 in collateral to obtain the loan, would be credited. In each case, the
defendant gave me money or property in order to convince me to part with
my own or to forestall apprehension and punishment. Consequently, a
'perpetuation exception' has the effect of wiping out the general principle
that loss is a net concept, and therefore the effect of treating identically
cases in which the economic harm to the victims is incontestably quite
different. In investment fraud schemes as elsewhere, the difference in harm
caused should be reflected in the sentence imposed.'l 7
The Seventh Circuit's approach of considering the net loss to the vic-
tim investors as a class is likewise questionable because windfalls be-
stowed on early investors in a Ponzi scheme do nothing to reduce the harm
inflicted on later investors left holding the bag. The CLC is convinced that
107 The 2001 Staff Draft suggests (though it does not propose specific language for) a 'perpetua-
tion rule' drawn to prohibit credits against loss in which the repayment is made in order to lure addi-
tional 'investments' in the scheme. 2001 Staff Draft, supra note I1, § 2(C)(iii)(e) [Option 2] (emphasis
added). The word 'additional' is presumably inserted to limit the exclusion to cases in which repay-
ments are made for the purpose of causing new losses, as distinct from preventing or delaying official
detection of old ones. Even with this modest limitation, the resulting rule remains objectionable.
First, although a narrow perpetuation rule would not apply in some fraud cases in which the
defendant steals from a single victim in a single fraudulent transaction, it would effectively wipe out
the net loss concept in most multi-victim frauds. As a class, economic criminals want to (a) avoid
detection, (b) keep stealing as long as they can, and (c) pay as little to the victims and keep as much for
themselves as they can get away with. Thus, virtually by definition, transfers of value to victims in
ongoing schemes will be designed in large measure to keep the scheme going. Therefore, under even a
'narrow' perpetuation rule, limited to cases in which repayment was made to secure additional sums,
virtually no victim repayments in multi-victim schemes would be subtracted from loss. Defendant A,
who took $10,000 from five people, but repaid $5,000 in the hope of 'perpetuating the scheme' and
securing additional investments, would receive the same sentence as Defendant B, who took $10,000
and repaid nothing, regardless of whether Defendant A received any additional investments followed
the repayment. Such a result amounts to abandonment of the idea that loss equates to economic harm.
Second, my generalizations in the preceding paragraph about defendants' motives would, of
course, be hotly disputed by the defendants themselves at sentencing. Consequently, the proposed rule
would force trial courts into making, in virtually every multi-victim case, difficult determinations
about the defendant's 'real' subjective motivations for the repayments (i.e., did the defendant make
payments because he was remorseful, because he wanted to escape detection, because he was a busi-
nessman who was drawn into fraud by financial reverses which he hoped to make good through illegal
speculation, or because he was an incorrigible con man who simply wanted to prolong a lucrative
scam?). Not only would the necessity of such determinations complicate sentencing proceedings, but
the potential for sentencing disparity between similarly situated defendants is immense. Any "per-
petuation rule" should be rejected.
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the Eleventh Circuit's 'loss to the losing victims' approach to multi-victim
fraud schemes represents the most sensible approach to the loss measure-
ment problem in investment cases. Accordingly, the CLC loss definition
provides:
In a case involving a fraudulent investment scheme, such as a 'Ponzi scheme,' the loss shall
not be reduced by the value of the economic benefit transferred to any investor in the
scheme in excess of that investor's principal investment (i.e., the gain to one investor in the
scheme shall not be used to offset the loss to another investor in the scheme).
108
b. Regulatory Offenses and Unlicensed Professionals
Some of the knottiest problems presented by the net vs. gross loss de-
bate are illustrated by cases in which defendants evaded FDA regulatory
processes in bringing drugs to market. In one case, United States v. Chat-
terji, the defendant provided false information to the FDA to gain approval
of a drug.'0 9 In another, United States v. Haas, the defendant purchased
drugs in Mexico for sale in the U.S., thus bypassing FDA controls."l 0 In
both cases, the defendant sold drugs that were equally effective as those
approved by the FDA. However, in Chatterji, the Fourth Circuit found no
economic harm and therefore no loss,"' while in Haas, the Fifth Circuit
found no economic harm, but sentenced the defendant based on his gain. A
similar problem was presented in United States v. Maurello, where the
Third Circuit held that a defendant convicted of mail fraud for deceiving
clients by practicing law without a license must be credited in the loss cal-
culation for the value of satisfactory legal services rendered."
2
Some observers, notably including the Justice Department, have been
concerned that those who place consumers at risk by evading regulatory
processes for drugs and other products and services should receive signifi-
cant sentences. The drafters of the CLC proposal concluded that the best
solution to the problem of evasion of regulatory controls would be a nar-
rowly targeted exception to the crediting rule under which loss would, by
definition, include "services fraudulently rendered to victims by persons
falsely posing as licensed professionals, or goods falsely represented as
approved by a governmental regulatory agency, or goods for which regu-
108 CLC Draft, infra App. A, § 2(C)(ii).
109 46 F.3d 1336 (4th Cir. 1995).
110 171 F.3d 259 (5th Cir. 1999).
111 Although in a later case involving nearly identical facts, United States v. Marcus, 82 F.3d 606
(4th Cir. 1996), the Fourth Circuit found the loss to be the value of the gross sales of an unapproved
drug, distinguishing Chatterji on the ground that the modifications of the drug formula in Marcus
affected the bioequivalence of the drug.
112 76 F.3d 1304, 1311-12 (3d Cir. 1996).
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latory approval by a government agency was obtained by fraud."'' 13
From a theoretical perspective, where Congress creates a regulatory
authority to regulate risky activities such as the production of medicine,
and a defendant intentionally circumvents that authority to make a profit,
the fact that the defendant lucked out and did not hurt or kill anybody does
not reduce the severity of the crime (or if it does, not by much). Consum-
ers are entitled to rely on the regulatory process. They would not, as a rule,
purchase products known to have been produced in defiance of regulatory
safeguards. Thus, the entire amount paid for the improperly certified item
is indeed a loss because it measures the out-of-pocket expense to fraudu-
lently misinformed consumers. Alternatively, if we consider that the vic-
tims of the conduct include the defendant's competitors-companies that
produce equivalent products in conformity with regulatory standards-the
value of the defendant's sales is a fair measure of the loss to the defendants
competitors. The same arguments can fairly be made in cases involving
unlicensed professionals.
The proposed rule for measuring loss in the regulatory arena also
solves a technical problem in the area of 'gain.' The Department of Justice
(DOJ) has in the past pressed for an extension of the concept of gain to
deal with regulatory cases such as these. That solution to the regulatory
crime problem would have a much greater distorting effect on the overall
structure of the loss definition than would this targeted provision for regu-
latory and unlicensed professional cases. The CLC proposal addresses
legitimate concerns about imposing appropriate punishment for regulatory
crimes without introducing the unpredictable complications that might
well ensue from elevating gain to equal footing with loss as a measure of
offense seriousness."
14
c. Items of De Minimis Value
Over the last several years, DOJ has repeatedly expressed concern
about any rule that would require the court to credit defendants for the
nearly worthless items sent by telemarketers in place of the items prom-
ised. For example, $5 plastic radios in place of the promised "stereo sys-
tem," common coins in place of the promised "rare collectibles," etc. The
113 CLC Draft, infra App. A, § 2(C)(i)(b).
114 Actually, if properly applied, the valuation and time-of measurement provisions of the CLC
proposal account for the unapproved drug cases. CLC Draft, infra App. A, §§ 2(E)(i), 2(D). Under the
CLC proposal, ifa defendant sells $10,000 worth of an unapproved drug or a drug for which approval
was fraudulently obtained, the loss to consumers is to be measured at the time of detection of the fraud.
Id. Once the misrepresentations are exposed at the time of detection, the market value of the drug in
the United States is zero (it cannot be sold legally), and thus the loss is the difference between zero and
the sum paid by consumers-that is, the entire $10,000. Nonetheless, a special provision emphasizing
that this is the proper result does no harm and gives assurance on the point to those who may feel the
need of it.
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Department is understandably concerned about two points: (1) that the
substituted product confers no real economic benefit on the persons re-
ceiving it, and thus should not reduce a defendant's punishment, and (2)
that calculating the value of the substituted product is, at best, a nuisance.
In response to DOJ concerns, Commission staff inserted language in
the 2001 Staff Draft that would exclude from loss anything transferred to
victims by defendants if the thing "has little or no value to the victim be-
cause it is substantially different from what the victim intended to re-
ceive." '1 5 As phrased, this exclusion has the potential to become a Trojan
horse undermining uniform application of the net loss concept. The prob-
lem is the emphasis on whether the economic benefit conferred is of little
or no value "to the victim because it is substantially different from what the
victim intended to receive.""1 6 In every fraud case, what the victim got was
"substantially different from what the victim intended to receive." If the
victim got what he intended to receive, there would be no crime. And in
many (perhaps most) cases, victims, if asked, will say that what they got is
of little or no value to them because it was not what they bargained for,
even if the thing transferred had substantial, measurable economic value.
The effect of including this provision as written would be to shift the focus
of the loss determination from an objective consideration of the market
value of whatever the defendant gave the victims to a subjective evaluation
of what the victim thinks is the value of what the defendant gave him.
No doubt many judges would read such a provision in the spirit it was
intended and apply it only rarely. One suspects, however, that a good
many others would be predisposed to apply it broadly to include in loss
even defendant-to-victim transfers of real objective economic value. At a
minimum, this predictable divergence in interpretation would complicate
loss calculations and create unjustifiable disparity between similarly-
situated defendants. Any advantage such a rule would confer in the narrow
class of telemarketing cases would be heavily outweighed by the real risk
of more general confusion and disparity.
The CLC proposal takes account of DOJ concerns, but avoids the
problems presented by the Commission staff language. It declines to credit
defendants for "items of de minimis value transferred by the defendant to
the victim(s). 117
3. Summary of the CLC Proposal on Crediting
The CLC proposal provides a simple, clean crediting rule that codifies
the basic principle that loss is a net concept that measures economic harm
115 2001 Staff Draft, supra note 11, § 2(C)(iii)(d)(1).
116 Id. (emphasis added).
117 CLC Draft, infra App. A, § 2(C)(i)(A).
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to the victim, and contains no qualification for payments to victims to
"perpetuate the scheme." The proposal provides no credit to defendants for
items of de minimis value transferred to victims as part of the scheme. In
addition, the CLC proposal includes a targeted provision clarifying loss
measurement in two classes of cases-regulatory fraud and unlicensed
professional services-that have given particular concern to courts and
prosecutors. This proposal is consistent with first principles and should
simplify application of the new loss definition.
4. Time of Measurement
Critical to any coherent and workable definition of loss are rules for
determining when loss should be measured. The time-of-measurement
problem actually has two basic components. The first is the question of
when to value the worth of stolen assets whose value fluctuates over time,
such as stock, precious metals, coins, commodities, real estate, and the
like. The second is when to count so-called "credits" against loss, such as
transfers to victims as part of the scheme, repayments to victims, and
posted collateral. The most common counting question is whether to re-
duce the loss amount by the value of things returned or conveyed to the
victim after the crime has been detected. This second component of the
time-of-measurement problem also has a sub-issue, in that there must be a
rule for when to value those things counted as credits.
For example, assume that a telemarketer sells and delivers to the vic-
tim, stock falsely represented to be worth $1,000, which is, at the time of
the sale, actually worth $300. The victim pays the telemarketer by giving
him a quantity of gold, then valued at $1,000. Assume further that, after
the fraud is detected, the telemarketer sends the victim a check for $700.
And assume still further that the true market value of the stock has
dropped to $200 as of the date of detection the fraud, but climbs up to
$400 by the time of sentencing. In the meantime, the value of the gold
increases to $1,100 at the time of detection, but has dropped to $900 by
sentencing day. Useful time-of-measurement rules must tell a sentencing
judge: (a) when to value the gold of which the victim was swindled; (b)
whether to reduce the amount of the loss by the value of the stock initially
transferred to the victim; (c) if so, when to value the stock transferred to
the victim; and (d) whether to reduce the amount of the loss by the amount
of the $700 check.
In theory, the loss could be measured (and its constituent elements
counted and valued) at any one of a number of points, including the time
the crime is legally complete, the time of detection, or the time of sen-
tencing. Moreover, one could envision time-of-measurement rules that
counted the components of loss at one time, but valued them at another.
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For example, the May 1999 Staff Draft dealt with the crediting problem by
counting as credits against loss only those transfers from defendants to
victims made prior to detection, but valuing the things transferred to the
victims as of the time of transfer.'" Similarly, the 2001 Staff Draft now
proposes as one option counting and valuing credits at the time of detec-
tion, while "measuring" (which suggests both counting and valuing) loss
generally at the time of sentencing." 9 At present, the CLC position is that,
to the extent possible, all the elements of the loss calculation should be
counted and valued at the same point in time. The prevailing view is that,
although there may be reasons to deviate in special cases from this princi-
ple, the greater the number of exceptions, the greater the potential for con-
fusion. In the view of the CLC, the most desirable point at which to meas-
ure loss is the time of detection.
In the first place, the time to count "credits" against loss is the time of
detection. If defendants were credited with repayments made after detec-
tion, but before sentencing, the rich (or those who had not yet spent their
criminal earnings) could buy themselves out of prison time.120 The univer-
sal rule now prevailing among those courts to have considered the question
is that credits against loss such as transfers to victims, pledges of collat-
eral, and repayments will be measured at the time of detection. 12 1
Second, it is equally clear that credits should not be valued prior to
detection. As noted above, previous staff drafts had suggested that things
of value transferred by a defendant to a victim and credited against loss
should be valued at the time of transfer.2 2 Valuing credits at the time of
transfer to the victim would prove terribly cumbersome in many multi-
victim or multi-transaction cases, and would produce substantively errone-
ous and unfair results in certain cases. Consider the following examples:
(A) Precious metals /rare coins boiler room: The defendants sell over
the telephone to hundreds of victims supposedly "rare" coins or ingots of
precious metals at vastly inflated prices. The defendants do send coins to
the victims, and the coins have some value. However, the value of the
118 See May 1999 Draft, supra note 8.
119 See 2001 Staff Draft, supra note 11, §§ 2(C)(iii), 2(C)(iii)(b), and 2(B) (Option 1).
120 See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 60 F.3d 240 (6th Cir. 1995).
121 See, e.g., United States v. Fraza, 106 F.3d 1050 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding loss is amount of
fraudulent loan not repaid at time offense was discovered); United States v. Shaffer, 35 F.3d 110 (3d
Cir. 1994) (time for determining loss is time crime is detected); United States v. Bolden, 889 F.2d
1336 (4th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Akin, 62 F.3d 700, 701 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting argu-
ment of check kiting defendant that the loss figure should be reduced by restitution payments made
between time of discovery of kite and sentencing, and holding loss to be measured at time of discovery
of scheme); United States v. Frydenlund, 990 F.2d 822 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 337, 126
L.Ed.2d 281 (1993) (rejecting argument that check kiting should be treated like fraudulently obtained
loan and instead measuring loss at time of discovery of scheme); United States v. Flowers, 55 F.3d
218, 220-22 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding in check kiting scheme that loss is to be amount of outstanding
bad checks, less any amount in accounts at time of discovery).
122 See, e.g., Field Test, supra note 6; May 1999 Draft, supra note 8.
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coins is much less than represented and the value fluctuates over time. In
such a case, the Commission staff s May 1999 time-of-measurement rule
would have required the court to determine the date of every "transfer" of
coins, and determine the value of the coins for every date on which a trans-
fer occurred. In a routine boiler room case, this would involve hundreds or
even thousands of different valuations.
(B) Stock fraud: Defendant makes an initial stock offering in the
penny stock market, and makes inflated and untrue claims in the prospec-
tus. Hundreds of victims buy the stock over a six-month period, during
which time the stock steadily gains in value. At the end of the six-month
period, the defendant's falsehoods come to light and the value of the stock
plunges to zero. In such a case, not only would the May 1999 "valuation at
time of transfer" rule require the court to determine the fluctuating price of
the bogus stock on every date on which there was a purchase, but it would
produce the absurd result that the victims would be found to have no loss at
all. Since the amount of money the victims paid to the defendant would be
offset by a credit for the market value of the stock on the date of transfer,
by definition the loss would be zero.
Similar phenomena occur in real estate schemes in which defendants
succeed in inflating the market value of otherwise undesirable property. In
all such schemes, measuring the value of the thing transferred to the victim
at the time of transfer produces a loss of zero. The only way around this
result is to argue that the "real" value of the transferred property at the
time of the transfer was not its then-current market price, but the value it
would have had if full information had been available. But this is nothing
more than a roundabout way of saying that the value of transferred prop-
erty in such cases is actually its value at the time of detection of the crime.
So why not adopt that rule in the first place?
The arguments just expressed have proven persuasive to both the
CLC and the Commission staff, and thus the views of the CLC and the
Commission staff on when to count and value credits are now in accord.
The knottier question remains when to measure loss more generally,
or to put it another way, when to count and value those components of loss
not involving credits. The argument favoring the CLC position that loss
should be measured at the time of detection may be summarized in this
way: in the first place, time-of-detection makes the best sense as the mo-
ment at which to "freeze the action" for purposes of measurement. Once a
crime is discovered by its victims, they can take steps to prevent further
losses. Likewise, once a crime is detected, defendants will ordinarily stop
their criminal behavior, either because they have been arrested or because
they fear arrest and do not wish to make their punishment worse. Thus, in
the ordinary case, the time of detection will be the point of maximum
2000]
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loSS. 123 Additionally, even though losses may sometimes continue to ac-
crue after detection up until sentencing despite the cessation of a defen-
dant's active criminal efforts, there is far too great a potential for arbitrari-
ness in measuring loss at the date of sentencing. For example, defendants
should not have to spend more time in prison because losses mount while
the government or the court delays a prosecution or sentencing.
24
Nonetheless, a case can be made for counting and valuing the "non-
credit" components of loss at the time of sentencing. In the first place,
there is at least some potential tension between a time-of-detection meas-
urement rule and the basic definition of loss as "reasonably foreseeable
pecuniary harm that resulted or will result" from the defendant's con-
duct. 125 Presumably, some of the harms that fall within this definition will
not manifest themselves until some time after the moment the crime is
detected. Moreover, one could argue that the valuation problem would be
made somewhat simpler because probation officers and other experts pre-
paring for sentencing could look to current market values of assets, as op-
posed to ascertaining those values at the earlier time of detection. How-
ever, I confess to finding the valuation argument uncompelling, as I doubt
that in most cases valuing assets on a past date certain would prove any
more difficult than providing a current market value.
The 2001 Staff Draft offers two options for time-of-measurement:
first, that loss should be measured at the time of sentencing (Option 1), or
second, that loss should be measured at the time the offense was detected
(Option 2). 126 The CLC has proposed the following time of measurement
rules:
Time of measurement: Loss should ordinarily be measured at the time the offense was de-
tected.
(i) For purposes of this guideline, an offense is detected when the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that the offense was detected by a victim or a public law en-
forcement agency.
123 Of course, if a defendant persisted in committing additional criminal conduct leading to new
losses after detection of the scheme, this rule would not cut off his sentencing liability for the new
losses because the additional conduct would not yet have been "detected" for purposes of the rule.
124 See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 54 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1995). In Stanley, a bank trust
officer bought bonds at high price for trust clients of bank. As the bonds began to devalue, the officer
misstated their value in bank records and in statements sent to clients. Hence, neither bank nor clients
could act to sell and stem losses. The Stanley court found loss was the amount of devaluation in the
period between when the misstatements were made to the bank and customers, and when the fraud was
discovered. Id.
125 CLC Draft, infra App. A, § 2A; 2001 Staff Draft, supra note II, § 2A.
126 2001 Staff Draft, supra note I1, § 2(B).
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(ii) Except as provided in subsection (D)(iii), the value of any "economic benefit"
transferred to the victim by the defendant for purposes of Subsection (C) shall be measured
at the time the offense was detected.
(iii) However, in a case involving collateral pledged by a defendant, the "economic
benefit" of such collateral to the victim for purposes of Subsection (C) is the amount the
victim has recovered at the time of sentencing from disposition of the collateral. If the col-
lateral has not been disposed of by that time, the "economic benefit" of the collateral is its
value at the time of sentencing.
12
These rules embody the principle that, in general, all components of
loss should be measured at the time of detection. This means that the
money or property obtained by the defendant from the victim, and the
money or property transferred back to the victim from the defendant dur-
ing the course of the scheme should all be counted and valued as of the
date of detection. The only exception to this general rule is the valuation of
pledged collateral. At present, such collateral is valued at either the
amount obtained by the victim through foreclosure and liquidation, or if
these events have not yet occurred by sentencing, at the fair market value
at the time of sentencing.128 For reasons of ease of administration and con-
tinuity with existing practice, the CLC proposal retains this limited excep-
tion to the general timing rule.
5. The Problem of Gain
I have been arguing for several years that a separate provision ad-
dressing a defendant's gain is superfluous in a properly drafted loss guide-
line because gain is unnecessary if the victims of defendant's conduct are
accurately identified. 129 Although I continue to think this is true in almost
all cases, cases do exist in which calculation of loss on a victim-by-victim
basis is impracticable, but calculation of defendant's gain is readily
achievable and represents a reasonable approximation of the harm to the
victims as a class. Therefore, it makes good sense to make gain available
as a means of approximating loss in such cases. The CLC proposal treats
gain in just this way, stating that: "The court shall use the defendant's gain
as an alternative measure of loss when loss cannot otherwise reasonably
be determined, but the defendant's gain can reasonably be determined.' 130
The CLC proposal correctly rejects the approach of several staff
drafts that propose using gain "instead of"13 1 or as "an alternative measure
127 CLC Draft, infra App. A, § 2D.
128 See HAINES & WOLL, supra note 30, at 484-88.
129 See Bowman, supra note 14, at 508.
130 CLC Draft, infra App. A, § 2F.
131 See May 1999 Draft, supra note 8.
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of" 13 2 loss where "gain is greater than loss and more accurately reflects the
seriousness of the offense."' 133 This approach has both theoretical and
practical problems. First, it is highly unlikely that gain will be truly greater
than loss. It is difficult to imagine how this could ever occur. If a defen-
dant's gain is simply the value of the money or property the defendant gets
from the victim without any reduction for the defendant's costs, then gain
exactly equals loss. If, as several participants in the loss debate have sug-
gested, the gain calculation should be net gain, that is the amount the de-
fendant retained from the crime after his expenses, then gain is, by defini-
tion, less than loss. All undertakings, even purely criminal ones, have
some overhead costs. Moreover, all of the proposals currently under con-
sideration-the April 1998 draft, the May 1999 draft, the 2001 Staff Draft,
and the CLC proposal-define loss as including reasonably foreseeable
pecuniary harms suffered by the victim in consequence of the defendant's
criminal conduct. Such foreseeable harms may make loss larger than gain,
because loss will include economic deprivations to the victims that do not
necessarily benefit the defendant. However, under these proposals a de-
fendant's pecuniary gain will never be larger than the pecuniary loss.
Second, using gain as loss in a case where gain exceeds loss (assum-
ing that it could) gives gain an independent significance. There is no theo-
retical problem with using gain as an alternate measure of loss when de-
fendant's gain is known to be less than the victims' loss, but the loss is
itself difficult to determine with specificity. In such a case, we are merely
conceding that we cannot as a practical matter discover the entire loss, and
so are content with using gain to establish a reliable minimum loss figure
to use in setting a sentence. However, if gain can indeed exceed loss and
the court can set a sentence based on gain instead of on loss, the court
would be punishing the defendant, not for the harm he had done anyone
else, but for the benefit he had obtained for himself.
Assume two cases. Defendant A steals $100 from Mr. Victim, as a re-
sult of which he somehow "gains" $1,000. Defendant B simply steals
$1,000 from Mr. Victim. The rule proposed by Commission staff would
punish Defendant A equally with Defendant B, even though Defendant B
stole ten times as much money from and caused ten times as much eco-
nomic harm to Mr. Victim. There is no justification either in criminal law
theory, or in common sense, for such a result.
F. Intended Loss
Intended loss is a decent proxy measurement of a defendant's culpa-
bility in uncompleted or partially uncompleted economic offenses. The
132 2001 Staff Draft, supra note II, § 2(D)(5) (Option 2).
133 See May 1999 Draft, supra note 8.
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CLC proposal embodies the view that the proper rule on intended loss is
the current one-that loss should be the greater of the actual loss or in-
tended loss. 134 By contrast, in its May 1999 draft, the staff suggested as
"Option 2" that loss be defined as either "the sum of actual loss and any
additional intended loss" or "the sum of actual loss and any intended loss
not resulting in actual Ioss.' ' 135 While the CLC understood and appreciated
the staff's thinking, it was unpersuaded by it.
There are certainly cases in which the defendant desired to cause pe-
cuniary harm in addition to the actual harm which his conduct did indeed
cause. But the vast majority of such cases are already accounted for by the
present rule. Consider, for example, a defendant who intends to defraud his
victims of $100,000, but only succeeds in getting away with $50,000 be-
fore being caught. In such a case, the staff proposal would add the $50,000
actually stolen to the additional $50,000 the defendant wanted to steal, but
couldn't, and get a loss of $100,000. But present rule dictates the identical
result because the $100,000 loss the defendant intended already includes
the $50,000 the defendant succeeded in stealing. The staff's proposal was
an attempt to address those cases in which (1) a defendant intends to cause
a loss in addition to the actual loss, and (2) the actual loss figure includes
economic harms reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, but not specifi-
cally intended by him. There are no doubt some such cases. There is rea-
son to doubt, however, that they are sufficiently common to make it
worthwhile to complicate the definition of loss. Happily, the 2001 Staff
Draft is now in accord with the CLC proposal. 1
36
CONCLUSION
Hopefully, readers will find the foregoing analysis useful. The project
of revising the loss definition has been ongoing since 1995, and has drawn
on the energy and talents of hundreds of lawyers, judges, past and present
Commissioners, and members of the Commission staff. It appears we are
very close to bringing this long project to successful fruition. The CLC
proposal incorporates the best work of many people, and is the best that
has so far been advanced. The Commission should act this spring to adopt
a reform measure very close to what the CLC has proposed.
134 Neither the current Guidelines nor any of the pending proposals amplify the meaning of the
word "intended." Drawing on general criminal law principles, it is fair to conclude that the intended
loss is the harm the defendant either desired to cause or was practically certain would result from his
offense. Whether any language making this point explicit should be included in the Guidelines remains
an open question.
135 May 1999 Draft, supra note 8.
136 2001 StaffDraft, supra note 11, § 2A.
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APPENDIX A
CLC PROPOSED 2001 DRAFT DEFINITION OF LOSS
In the Commentary to sections 2B 1.1 and 2F 1.1 captioned "Applica-
tion Notes" insert after Note 1 the following new Note 2:
2. For purposes of subsection (b)(1):
(A) General Rule. Loss is the greater of the actual loss or the in-
tended loss.
"Actual loss" means the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm
that resulted or will result from the conduct for which the defen-
dant is accountable under § B 1.3 (Relevant Conduct).
"Reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm" means pecuniary
harm that the defendant knew or, under the circumstances of the
particular case, reasonably should have known likely would re-
sult in the ordinary course of events from the conduct for which
the defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).
"Intended loss" means the pecuniary harm that was intended to
result from the conduct for which the defendant is accountable
under § lB1.3, even if that harm would have been impossible or
unlikely to occur (e.g., as in a government sting operation, or an
intended insurance fraud in which the claim exceeded the in-
sured value), so long as the intended loss would reasonably have
resulted if the facts were as the defendant believed them to be.
(B) Exclusions from Loss. Loss does not include the following:
(i) Interest of any kind, finance charges, late fees, penalties,
anticipated profits, or amounts based on an agreed-upon
return or rate of return.
(ii) Costs to the government of, and costs incurred by victims
primarily to aid the government in, the prosecution and
criminal investigation of an offense, even if such costs are
reasonably foreseeable.
(C) Credits In Determining Loss.
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(i) Loss shall be determined by excluding the value of the eco-
nomic benefit the defendant or other persons acting jointly
with the defendant transferred to the victim before the of-
fense was detected. However, loss shall not be reduced by
the value of:
(a) benefits of de minimis value transferred by the defen-
dant to the victim(s).
(b) services fraudulently rendered to victims by persons
falsely posing as licensed professionals, or goods
falsely represented as approved by a governmental
regulatory agency, or goods for which regulatory ap-
proval by a government agency was obtained by fraud.
(ii) In a case involving a fraudulent investment scheme, such as
a "Ponzi scheme, " the loss shall not be reduced by the
value of the economic benefit transferred to any investor in
the scheme in excess of that investor's principal investment
(i.e., the gain to one investor in the scheme shall not be used
to offset the loss to another investor in the scheme).
(iii) For purposes of this subsection: (A) "economic benefit"
means money, property, or services performed; and (B)
"transferred" includes pledged or otherwise provided as
collateral, returned, repaid, or otherwise conveyed.
(D) Time of measurement: Loss should ordinarily be measured at the
time the offense was detected.
(i) For purposes of this guideline, an offense is detected when
the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that
the offense was detected by a victim or a public law en-
forcement agency.
(ii) Except as provided in subsection (D)(iii), the value of any
"economic benefit" transferred to the victim by the defen-
dant for purposes of Subsection (C) shall be measured at
the time the offense was detected.
(iii) However, in a case involving collateral pledged by a defen-
dant, the "economic benefit" of such collateral to the victim
for purposes of Subsection (C) is the amount the victim has
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recovered at the time of sentencing from disposition of the
collateral. If the collateral has not been disposed of by that
time, the "economic benefit" of the collateral is its value at
the time of sentencing.
(E) Estimation of Loss. The court need not determine the precise
amount of the loss. Rather, it need only make a reasonable esti-
mate of loss. The sentencing judge is in a unique position to as-
sess the evidence and estimate the loss based upon that evidence.
For this reason, the court's loss determination is entitled to ap-
propriate deference. See 18 U.S.C. § 3 742(e) and (.
The estimate of the loss shall be based on available information, tak-
ing into account and using as appropriate and practicable under the
circumstances, factors such as the following:
(i) The fair market value of the property, or other thing of
value, taken or otherwise unlawfully acquired, misapplied,
misappropriated, or destroyed; or if the fair market value is
impracticable to determine or inadequately measures the
harm, the cost to the victim of replacing that property or
other thing of value.
(ii) The cost of repairs to damaged property, not to exceed the
replacement cost had the property been destroyed.
(iii) The approximate number of victims multiplied by the aver-
age loss to each victim.
(iv) More general factors, such as the scope and duration of the
offense and revenues generated by similar operations.
(F) Gain. The court shall use the defendant's gain as an alternative
measure of loss when loss cannot otherwise reasonably be de-
termined, but the defendant's gain can reasonably be deter-
mined.
(G) Special Rules. The following special rules shall be used to assist
in determining actual loss in the cases indicated:
(i) Stolen or Counterfeit Credit Cards and Access Devices;
Purloined Numbers and Codes. In a case involving stolen or
counterfeit credit cards (see 15 U.S. C. § 1602(k)), stolen or
[VOL. 9:2
HeinOnline  -- 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 492 2000-2001
A JUDICIOUS SOLUTION
counterfeit access devices (see 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1)), or
purloined numbers or codes, the actua! loss includes any
unauthorized charges made with the credit cards, access
devices, or numbers or codes. The actual loss determined
for each such credit card, access device, number or code
shall be not less than $500.
(ii) Diversion of Government Program Benefits. In a case in-
volving diversion of government program benefits, actual
loss is the value of the benefits diverted from intended re-
cipients or uses. For example, if the defendant was the
lawful recipient offood stamps having a value of $100 but
fraudulently received food stamps having a value of $150,
the loss is $50.
(iii) Davis-Bacon Act Cases. In a case involving a Davis-Bacon
Act violation (i.e., a violation of 40 US.C. § 276a, crimi-
nally prosecuted under 18 US. C. § 1001), the actual loss is
the difference between the legally required and actual
wages paid.
(H) Departure Considerations.
(i) Upward Departure Considerations. There may be cases in
which the loss substantially understates the seriousness of
the offense or the culpability of the defendant. In such cases,
an upward departure may be warranted. The following is a
non-exhaustive list offactors that the court may consider in
determining whether an upward departure is warranted:
(a) A primary objective of the offense was an aggravating,
non-monetary objective, such as to inflict emotional
harm.
(b) The offense resulted in or risked substantial non-
monetary harm. For example, the offense caused
physical harm, psychological harm, or severe emo-
tional trauma, or resulted in a substantial invasion of a
privacy interest.
(c) The offense created a risk of substantial loss beyond
the loss determined above.
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(d) The offense endangered the solvency or financial secu-
rity of one or more victims.
(e) The offense involved a substantial risk that a victim
would lose a significant portion of his or her net worth
or suffer other significant financial hardship.
(ii) Downward Departure Considerations. There may be cases
in which the loss substantially overstates the seriousness of
the offense or the culpability of the defendant. In such cases,
a downward departure may be warranted. The following is
a non-exhaustive list offactors that the court may consider
in determining whether a downward departure is war-
ranted:
(a) The primary objective of the offense was a mitigating,
non-monetary objective, such as to fund medical treat-
ment for a sick parent. However, if, in addition to that
primary objective, a substantial objective of the offense
was to benefit the defendant economically, a downward
departure for this reason would not ordinarily be war-
ranted.
(b) The loss significantly exceeds the greater of the defen-
dant's actual or intended personal gain, and therefore
significantly overstates the culpability of the defendant.
Background:
The Commission has determined that, ordinarily, the sentences of
defendants convicted of federal offenses should reflect the nature and
magnitude of the pecuniary harm caused by their crimes. Accordingly,
along with other relevant factors under the guidelines, loss serves as a
measure of the seriousness of the offense and the defendant's relative cul-
pability and is a principal factor in determining the offense level under this
guideline.
Both direct and indirect pecuniary harm that is a reasonably foreseeable
result of the offense will be taken into account in determining the loss. For
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example, in an offense involving unlawfully accessing, or exceeding
authorized access to, a "protected computer, " as defined in 18 U.S. C. §
1030(e)(2)(A) or (B), "loss" is the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm
to the victim, which typically includes costs such as conducting a damage
assessment and restoring the system and data to their condition prior to
the offense. Likewise, in a product substitution case, the loss includes the
victim's reasonably foreseeable costs of making substitute transactions
and handling or disposing of the product delivered or modifying the prod-
uct so that it can be used for its intended purpose, plus the victim's rea-
sonably foreseeable cost of correcting the actual or potential disruption to
the victim's business caused by the product substitution. Similarly, in a
defense contract fraud case, loss includes the reasonably foreseeable ad-
ministrative cost to the government and other participants of repeating or
correcting the procurement action affected, plus any increased cost to
procure the product or service involved that was reasonably foreseeable.
[Make all technical and conforming amendments necessary to fully exe-
cute this amendment.]
APPENDIX B
CURRENT GUIDELINES PROVISIONS DEFINING "Loss" FROM U.S.S.G. §
2B 1.1 (THEFT OFFENSES), APPLICATION NOTES
2. "Loss'" means the value of the property taken, damaged, or de-
stroyed. Ordinarily, when property is taken or destroyed the loss is
the fair market value of the particular property at issue. Where the
market value is difficult to ascertain or inadequate to measure harm
to the victim, the court may measure loss in some other way, such as
reasonable replacement cost to the victim. Loss does not include the
interest that could have been earned had the funds not been stolen.
When property is damaged, the loss is the cost of repairs, not to ex-
ceed the loss had the property been destroyed. Examples: (1) In the
case of a theft of a check or money order, the loss is the loss that
would have occurred if the check or money order had been cashed.
(2) In the case of a defendant apprehended taking a vehicle, the loss
is the value of the vehicle even if the vehicle is recovered immediately.
Where the offense involved making a fraudulent loan or credit card
application, or other unlawful conduct involving a loan or credit
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card, the loss is to be determined under the principles set forth in the
Commentary to § 2F1.1 (Fraud and Deceit).
In certain cases, an offense may involve a series of transactions with-
out a corresponding increase in loss. For example, a defendant may
embezzle $5,000 from a bank and conceal this embezzlement by
shifting this amount from one account to another in a series of nine
transactions over a six-month period. In this example, the loss is
$5,000 (the amount taken), not $45,000 (the sum of the nine transac-
tions), because the additional transactions did not increase the actual
or potential loss.
In stolen property offenses (receiving, transporting, transferring,
transmitting, or possessing stolen property), the loss is the value of
the stolen property determined as in a theft offense.
In an offense involving unlawfully accessing, or exceeding authorized
access to, a "protected computer" as defined in 18 U.S.C. §
1030(e)(2)(A) or (B), "loss" includes the reasonable cost to the vic-
tim of conducting a damage assessment, restoring the system and
data to their condition prior to the offense, and any lost revenue due
to interruption of service.
In the case of a partially completed offense (e.g., an offense involving
a completed theft that is part of a larger, attempted theft), the offense
level is to be determined in accordance with the provisions of§ 2X1. 1
(Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy) whether the conviction is for
the substantive offense, the inchoate offense (attempt, solicitation, or
conspiracy), or both; see Application Note 4 in the Commentary to §
2Xl. 1.
3. For the purposes of subsection (b)(1), the loss need not be determined
with precision. The court need only make a reasonable estimate of the
loss, given the available information. This estimate, for example, may
be based upon the approximate number of victims and the average
loss to each victim, or on more general factors such as the scope and
duration of the offense.
4. The loss includes any unauthorized charges made with stolen credit
cards, but in no event less than $100 per card. See Commentary to §§
2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy) and 2F1.1 (Fraud and
Deceit).
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5. Controlled substances should be valued at their estimated street
value.
15. In cases where the loss determined under subsection (b)(1) does not
fully capture the harmfulness of the conduct, an upward departure
may be warranted. For example, the theft of personal information or
writings (e.g., medical records, educational records, a diary) may in-
volve a substantial invasion of a privacy interest that would not be
addressed by the monetary loss provisions of subsection (b)(1).
Background: The value of the property stolen plays an important role in
determining sentences for theft and other offenses involving stolen prop-
erty because it is an indicator of both the harm to the victim and the gain
to the defendant. Because of the structure of the Sentencing Table (Chap-
ter 5, Part A), subsection (b)(1) results in an overlapping range of en-
hancements based on the loss.
From U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 (Fraud Offenses), Application Notes
8. Valuation of loss is discussed in the Commentary to § 2B1.1 (Lar-
ceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft). As in theft cases,
loss is the value of the money, property, or services unlawfully taken;
it does not, for example, include interest the victim could have earned
on such funds had the offense not occurred. Consistent with the provi-
sions of§ 2X. 1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy), if an intended
loss that the defendant was attempting to inflict can be determined,
this figure will be used if it is greater than the actual loss. Frequently,
loss in a fraud case will be the same as in a theft case. For example, if
the fraud consisted of selling or attempting to sell $40,000 in worth-
less securities, or representing that a forged check for $40,000 was
genuine, the loss would be $40,000.
There are, however, instances where additional factors are to be con-
sidered in determining the loss or intended loss:
(a) Fraud Involving Misrepresentation of the Value of an Item or
Product Substitution
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A fraud may involve the misrepresentation of the value of an
Item that does have some value (in contrast to an item that is
worthless). Where, for example, a defendant fraudulently repre-
sents that stock is worth $40,000 and the stock is worth only
$10,000, the loss is the amount by which the stock was overval-
ued (i.e., $30,000). In a case involving a misrepresentation con-
cerning the quality of a consumer product, the loss is the differ-
ence between the amount paid by the victim for the product and
the amount for which the victim could resell the product re-
ceived.
(b) Fraudulent Loan Application and Contract Procurement Cases
In fraudulent loan application cases and contract procurement
cases, the loss is the actual loss to the victim (or if the loss has
not yet come about, the expected loss). For example, if a defen-
dant fraudulently obtains a loan by misrepresenting the value of
his assets, the loss is the amount of the loan not repaid at the
time the offense is discovered, reduced by the amount the lending
institution has recovered (or can expect to recover) from any as-
sets pledged to secure the loan. However, where the intended
loss is greater than the actual loss, the intended loss is to be
used.
In some cases, the loss determined above may significantly un-
derstate or overstate the seriousness of the defendant's conduct.
For example, where the defendant substantially understated his
debts to obtain a loan, which he nevertheless repaid, the loss
determined above (zero loss) will tend not to reflect adequately
the risk of loss created by the defendant's conduct. Conversely, a
defendant may understate his debts to a limited degree to obtain
a loan (e.g., to expand a grain export business), which he genu-
inely expected to repay and for which he would have qualified at
a higher interest rate had he made truthful disclosure, but he is
unable to repay the loan because of some unforeseen event (e.g.,
an embargo imposed on grain exports) which would have caused
a default in any event. In such a case, the loss determined above
may overstate the seriousness of the defendant's conduct. Where
the loss determined above significantly understates or overstates
the seriousness of the defendant's conduct, an upward or down-
ward departure may be warranted.
(c) Consequential Damages in Procurement Fraud and Product
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Substitution Cases
In contrast to other types of cases, loss in a procurement fraud
or product substitution case includes not only direct damages,
but also consequential damages that were reasonably foresee-
able. For example, in a case involving a defense product substi-
tution offense, the loss includes the government's reasonably
foreseeable costs of making substitute transactions and handling
or disposing of the product delivered or retrofitting the product
so that it can be used for its intended purpose, plus the govern-
ment's reasonably foreseeable cost of rectifying the actual or
potential disruption to government operations caused by the
product substitution. Similarly, in the case of fraud affecting a
defense contract award, loss includes the reasonably foreseeable
administrative cost to the government and other participants of
repeating or correcting the procurement action affected, plus
any increased cost to procure the product or service involved
that was reasonably foreseeable. Inclusion of reasonably fore-
seeable consequential damages directly in the calculation of loss
in procurement fraud and product substitution cases reflects that
such damages frequently are substantial in such cases.
(d) Diversion of Government Program Benefits
In a case involving diversion of government program benefits,
loss is the value of the benefits diverted from intended recipients
or uses.
(e) Davis-Bacon Act Cases
In a case involving a Davis-Bacon Act violation (a violation of
40 U.S.C § 276a, criminally prosecuted under 18 US.C. §
1001), the loss is the difference between the legally required and
actual wages paid.
9. For the purposes of subsection (b) (1), the loss need not be determined
with precision. The court need only make a reasonable estimate of the
loss, given the available information. This estimate, for example, may
be based on the approximate number of victims and an estimate of the
average loss to each victim, or on more general factors, such as the
nature and duration of the fraud and the revenues generated by simi-
lar operations. The offender's gain from committing the fraud is an
alternative estimate that ordinarily will underestimate the loss.
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11. In cases in which the loss determined under subsection (b)(1) does
not fully capture the harmfulness and seriousness of the conduct, an
upward departure may be warranted. Examples may include the fol-
lowing:
(a) a primary objective of the fraud was non-monetary; or the fraud
caused or risked reasonably foreseeable, substantial non-
monetary harm;
(b) false statements were made for the purpose of facilitating some
other crime;
(c) the offense caused reasonably foreseeable, physical or psycho-
logical harm or severe emotional trauma;
(d) the offense endangered national security or military readiness;
(e) the offense caused a loss of confidence in an important institu-
tion;
(9 the offense involved the knowing endangerment of the solvency
of one or more victims.
In a few instances, the loss determined under subsection (b) (1) may
overstate the seriousness of the offense. This may occur, for example,
where a defendant attempted to negotiate an instrument that was so
obviously fraudulent that no one would seriously consider honoring
it. In such cases, a downward departure may be warranted.
12. Offenses involving fraudulent identification documents and access
devices, in violation of 18 U.S. C §§ 1028 and 1029, are also covered
by this guideline. Where the primary purpose of the offense involved
the unlawful production, transfer, possession, or use of identification
documents for the purpose of violating, or assisting another to vio-
late, the laws relating to naturalization, citizenship, or legal resident
status, apply § 2L2.1 or § 2L2.2, as appropriate, rather than § 2Fl.1.
In the case of an offense involving false identification documents or
access devices, an upward departure may be warranted where the
actual loss does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the conduct.
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Background: This guideline is designed to apply to a wide variety offraud
cases. The statutory maximum term of imprisonment for most such offenses
is five years. The guideline does not link offense characteristics to specific
code sections. Because federal fraud statutes are so broadly written, a
single pattern of offense conduct usually can be prosecuted under several
code sections, as a result of which the offense of conviction may be some-
what arbitrary. Furthermore, most fraud statutes cover a broad range of
conduct with extreme variation in severity.
Empirical analyses of pre-guidelines practice showed that the most
important factors that determined sentence length were the amount of loss
and whether the offense was an isolated crime of opportunity or was so-
phisticated or repeated. Accordingly, although they are imperfect, these
are the primary factors upon which the guideline has been based.
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